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ARTICLES 
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 

AND SETTLEMENTS: DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES 

OF THE RIGHT TO PETITION 

RAYMONDKu· 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the First Amendmentl and the antitrust laws2 serve as 
twin pillars upholding our political and economic liberty.) What happens, 
however, when these powerful laws collide? This Article examines the interplay 
of the antitrust laws and the First Amendment right to petition,4 or what is more 
commonly referred to as Noerr-Pennington immunity.s In brief, Noerr provides 
• Associate Professor ofLaw, Thomas Jefferson School ofLaw; Director, Center for Law, 
Technology & Communications. A.B., Brown University; J.D., New York University School of 
Law; Fellow, Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program (1994-95). I would like to thank 
Michael Farber for his insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts ofthis Article as well 
as the faculties of Southern Illinois University School of Law, St. Thomas University School of 
Law, and Thomas Jefferson School of Law where earlier versions of this Article were presented. 
1 would also like to thank my research assistant Carlos Cabrera for his assistance. Special thanks 
to my wife, Melissa, for her comments, patience, and support without which this would not have 
been possible. 
I . U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.c. § I (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ("Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be iIlegal."); 15 U.S.C. § 2 ("Every 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...."). 
3. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in 
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as 
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of 
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."). 
4. "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom ofspeech, or ofthe press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
5. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, hereinafter Noerr, refers to a series ofdecisions by the 
United States Supreme Court beginning with Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
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immunity from antitrust liability for anticompetitive harms that flow from 
exercising the right to petition.6 While significant attention has been paid to the 
potential for Noerr immunity to be misused in efforts to use governmental 
processes to impose costs upon competitors,7 there has been virtually no 
discussion with respect to whether the First Amendment right to petition may be 
used to immunize cooperative/collusive behavior that could nonetheless 
adversely impact competition.s This has been compounded by the Supreme 
Court's failure to articulate a clear explanation for when private conduct is 
considered immune under the First Amendment.9 Moreover, while there have 
been scholarly efforts to provide a coherent doctrine governing when private 
conduct is immune from antitrust liability, none has provided a doctrinal 
explanation of Noerr immunity through the lens of the right to petition that is 
consistent with its historic role in Anglo-American government. lO Specifically, 
Motor Freight, inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965), in which the Court recognized antitrust immunity for certain conduct related to the right to 
petition. 
6. See generally 2 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 989-1016 
(3d ed. 1992) (discussing Noerr doctrine) [hereinafter ALD]. 
7. See ROBERTH. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347­
64 (1993); Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability/or Attempts to Influence Government Action: The 
Basis and Limits 0/ the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); James D. 
Hurwitz, Abuse o/Governmental Process, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries ofNoerr, 74 
GEO. L. J. 65 (1985); David L. Meyer, A Standard/or Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More 
Closely to the First Amendment Mandate, 95 YALEL. J. 832 (1986); see also City ofColumbia v. 
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) ("The 'sham' exception to Noerr 
encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome 
of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon."). 
8. For one of the few examples of such a discussion, see Susan P. Koniak & George M. 
Cohen, Under Cloak o/Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1996), examining collusion between class 
action counsel with respect to attorneys' fees and whether such abuse is sanctionable. See also 
Harry M. Reasoner & Scott J. Adler, The Settlement of Litigation as a Ground for Antitrust 
Liability, 50 ANTITRUSTL. J. 115 (1981). 
9. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Making Sense ofAntitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L. 
REv. 1177, 1178 (1992) ("The problem was more than a failure to set forth clear general rules for 
defining the scope of the immunity. The larger problem was that, as the exceptions were defined, 
adjudication consisted of pasting a conclusory label on the petitioning activity at issue."); David 
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and 
the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J. L. & Pus. POL'y 293, 298 (1994) (noting that the area of law is 
replete with "doctrinal confusion"). 
10. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1202 ("What justifies antitrust immunity is not the 
means chose 'but a disinterested and accountable decisionmaking process for choosing those 
means. As long as neither the government nor its officials has a financial interest in the 
governmental action, antitrust immunity should apply to both the government and the petitioners."); 
Gary Minda, interest Groups. Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 905 (1990) (analyzing petitioning immunity under 
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this Article examines whether settlement agreements and consent decrees 
resulting from what would otherwise be immunized litigation are protected from 
antitrust scrutiny and liability under Noerr. In order to conduct this analysis, this 
Article develops a methodology for detennining immunity by focusing the 
immunity examination upon the means used to petition government and the 
source of the alleged injuries. II Ultimately, private conduct is immune from 
antitrust scrutiny when it represents a valid attempt to persuade an independent 
governmental decision-maker in an effort to solicit government action, and the 
alleged injuries result from that persuasive effort.'2 The validity of any effort 
depends upon the forum in which the petitioning is conducted without reference 
to antitrust. By focusing upon the means used to petition government, this 
analysis ensures that Noerr immunity protects the people's right to petition their 
government for the redress of grievances without unnecessarily limiting the 
protection afforded by the antitrust laws. 
One commentator has observed that "[t]he notion that the settlement of 
litigation-a practice so favored in the administration ofjustice-is in itself a 
ground ofantitrust liability rings strange to the ear.,,13 Before we decide whether 
the instrument needs tuning or our hearing needs testing, consider two 
hypotheticals: 
1) 	 Netscape sues Microsoft in private antitrust litigation raising 
antitrust, intellectual property, and state unfair competition 
claims. During the course of the litigation, the parties begin to 
negotiate and realize that it would be mutually advantageous for 
the two leading providers ofInternet browser software to divide 
the market between themselves rather than continue litigating 
and competing against one another. For example, Microsoft 
might agree to cease distribution of its browser and instead 
public choice theory). 
In one of the most lucid discussions on this topic, Professor Elhauge argues for a functional 
process approach in which immunity is primarily determined by examining the "incentive structure 
underlying the decisionmaking process that produces the restraint ..." Elhauge, supra note 9, at 
1180. Others have argued that immunity should be examined under principles akin to public fora 
analysis in free speech cases. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 9. More often, commentators 
attempt to interpret Noerr immunity through the filter of federal antitrust policy. See, e.g., Meyer, 
supra note 7, at 832 (proposing that "immunity [should] not be granted when . . . petitioning 
produces unnecessary direct antitrust injury and the governmental action sought is illegitimate.") 
(emphasis added); James S. Wrona, A Clash o/Titans: The First Amendment Right to Petition vs. 
the Antitrust Laws, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 637, 656 (1994) ("When analyzing antitrust cases 
involving petitioning to the government, courts focus on whether the activity's effect would 
seriously offend traditional antitrust policies. . . . This approach maintains a delicate balance 
between two important principles."). 
II. 	 See infra Part ". 
12. See infra Part /I . 
13. Reasoner & Adler, supra note 8, at lIS . 
388 	 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:385 
incorporate Netscape's browser into its Windows operating 
system. In exchange, Netscape would agree to drop its lawsuit 
and share revenues with Microsoft. The end result of course 
would be an agreement between the two dominant players in the 
browser industry effectively dividing the market between 
themselves. 
2) 	 A group of small to mid-size book sellers sue the various 
publishing companies alleging price discrimination in response 
to an industry practice in which book publishers sell various 
titles to larger retail establishments such as Barnes & Noble at 
significantly discounted prices. During the litigation, the 
plaintiffs enter into settlement agreements with each of the 
various publisher defendants setting an appropriate wholesale 
price for books with each of the settlement agreements 
containing a most favored nation clause that incorporates the 
most favorable price reached in the negotiations of each 
agreement. Once the final settlement is reached, there will 
effectively be a single, uniform wholesale price for books 
throughout the entire industry. In the final coup de grace, the 
parties could even ask the court to approve the terms of the 
settlement agreement and enter them as part ofa consent decree. 
I f entered into outside ofthe context of litigation, these hypothetical agreements 
would almost certainly be subject to antitrust scrutiny, and could potentially 
result in significant antitrust liability.14 The critical question, therefore, is 
whether the context and nature ofentering into these agreements with respect to 
the settlement oflitigation are sufficiently distinct under constitutional principles 
to remove them from the purview of antitrust laws. 
The implications ifsuch immunity is recognized are staggering. Ifsettlement 
agreements such as these are immune from antitrust scrutiny under Noerr and the 
participants immune from liability, no one, not the Federal government, the 
various state governments, let alone competitors, would be permitted to challenge 
or even examine the terms and consequences ofthe agreements-this immunity 
is the essential promise of the right to petition as recognized under Noerr.15 
When combined with the growing use of protective orders to cloak settlement 
agreements in secrecy, 16 entire industries may be monopolized, prices fixed, and 
14. The first hypothetical could be considered a horizontal restraint of trade or a conspiracy 
to monopolize the web browsing industry. See I ALD, supra note 6, at 60-77, 195-96. The second 
hypothetical could be considered an unreasonable restraint of trade as a result of price fixing. See 
id. at 63-67. 
15 . 	 See infra Part LB. 
16. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of 
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283 (1999) (discussing 
secrecy in the settlement process). 
389 2000] THE RIGHT TO PETITION 
have their markets divided, without anyone being the wiser. So, while the notion 
that settlement agreements may be the basis for antitrust liability "may ring 
strange to the ear," the opposite conclusion also strikes a rather discordant note. 
Immunity under these circumstances represents a loophole large enough to 
swallow the Sherman Act itself. Despite this potential, the highest court to touch 
upon this issue to date suggested that so long as the litigation itself is not a sham, 
immunity is compelled by Constitutional principles. 17 
This Article analyzes the right to petition and the Noerr doctrine and 
suggests that immunity under Noerr is justified only when the conduct in 
question represents valid petitioning, and argues that settlement agreements and 
consent decrees should not be immune from antitrust scrutiny even when a court 
is asked to approve the agreement prior to dismissal. Part I examines the history 
.of the right to petition and doctrinal development of the right in the antitrust 
context, and how that case law could be used to support a claim for immunity. 
Part II develops from the right's history and the Supreme Court's case law, a 
methodology for determining when private conduct is immune from antitrust 
scrutiny under Noerr and the right to petition. Part III examines the context of 
private settlements under the proposed methodology and concludes that in the 
contextofthe settlement oflitigation, the historical,jurisprudential, and doctrinal 
justifications for immunity are noticeably absent. After examining whether 
judicial approval of settlements and their incorporation into consent decrees are 
sufficient to justify Noerr immunity, Part IV concludes that the right to petition 
is still insufficient to justify antitrust immunity. 
I. ORIGINS 
Before exam ining whether settlement agreements and consent decrees should 
be protected by the right to petition, a brief discussion of the origins of the right 
is in order. The right to petition is the capstone right of the First Amendment, 
but, outside the context of antitrust, it is seldom discussed or invoked in 
constitutional jurisprudence:s When it is discussed, it is usually treated as 
17. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525, 
1528-29 (9th Cir. 1991), afJ'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 49 (1993). The Supreme Court has 
never directly addressed this issue. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), the 
Court examined whether certain cross-licensing agreements between patent holders entered into in 
order to settle infringement suits violated the Sherman Act. See id. at 168. While the decision 
could be interpreted to recognize that settlement agreements are not immune from antitrust laws, 
the decision predates Noerr, and as such, the Court was not directly confronted with the issue of 
immunity. Similarly in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), decided 
after Noerr, the Court once again examined whether cross-licensing agreements entered into to end 
litigation violated the antitrust laws. See id. at 177-78. Despite being asked, the Court specifically 
refused to address whether the settlement agreements themselves could form the basis for antitrust 
liability. See id. at 190 n.7. 
18. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance 
ofthe Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAML. REv. 2153 (1998); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law 
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simply part ofthe rights offree expression and association. 19 Even in the context 
of antitrust law, the development of the right to petition is a relatively recent 
event. It was n6t until 1961 in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc.,2° that the Supreme Court slowly began to interpret the right 
to petition and how it impacts antitrust law. 
A. The History 
1. The Classical Right ofPetition in g.-H istorically, the right to petition was 
considered one of the most fundamental of English and colonial American 
rights. 21 In England, the petition was used to secure the Magna Carta, and its 
abuse by James II "led directly to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and to the Bill 
of Rights that fully confirmed the right to petition as an element of the British 
constitution [sic]. ,>22 By the Seventeenth Century, petitioning was considered an 
ancient right and was part ofthe regular political life ofthe English.23 According 
to one commentator, unlike freedom of speech, press, and assembly which were 
in practice constantly restrained, by the Eighteenth Century, the right to petition 
was an absolute right in England.24 
Likewise, in the American colonies and the United States prior to the Civil 
War, the right to petition was equally esteemed. For example, in 1641 the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony Assembly became the first colony to affirm the right · 
explicitly, and, by its terms, the right applied to residents and non-residents, free 
and not free alike. 
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free shall have 
libertie to come to any publique Court, Councell, or Towne meeting, and 
either by speech or writing to move any lawful!, seasonable, and 
materiall question, or to present any necessary motion, complaint, 
petition, Bill or information, where of that meeting hath proper 
Abridging . .. ": An Analysis a/the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right a/Petition, 54 U. ON. 
L. REV. 1153 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government/or 
a Redress a/Grievances: Cutfrom a DljJerent Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17 (\ 993); 
Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History o/the Right to Petition Government/or the Redress 
0/ Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (\986). For a general overview of the Supreme Court 's 
interpretation of the right to petition, see John E. Theuman, Annotation, Right 0/ Petition and 
Assembly Under Federal Constitution's First Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 86 L.Ed.2d 758 
(1985); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment Right to 
Petition the Government/or a Redress o/Grievances, 30 L.Ed.2d 914 (1973). 
19. See Rydstrom, supra note 18, at 915. 
20. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
21 . See Mark, supra note 18, at 2169; Smith, supra note 18, at 1153; Spanbauer, supra note 
18, at 17; Higginson, supra note 18, at 155. 
22. Smith, supra note 18, at 1160. 
23. See id. at J 157. 
24. See id. at 1162-68; see also Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 17 (arguing that "[h listorically, 
the right to petition was a distinct right, superior to the other expressive rights."). 
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cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order, and respective 
manner?5 
As one commentator notes, the "Colonial experience appears not only to have 
replicated England's widespread use of the petition, it likely extended it in both 
law and practice.,,26 In part, this was because the petition was a useful means for 
colonial assemblies to expand their sphere of influence by expanding both the 
types of matters the assemblies had jurisdiction to consider and their power to 
gather facts relating to the petitions.27 Petitions covered all sorts of subject 
matter from disputes over land, termination ofentail, and financial assistance to 
emancipation?8 
Additionally, the right to petition not only covered diverse subject matter but 
was exercised by the elite as well as individuals and groups who were otherwise 
. excluded from voting and other means of formal political participation.29 For 
example, in the colonies and the fledgling United States, the right was exercised 
by disenfranchised groups such as women, blacks, Native Americans, and 
children.3D The fact that the right to petition extended to such disenfranchised 
groups may be surprising to us today, but it is quite understandable given the 
origins of petitioning. Petitioning originally arose under Monarchial rule when 
everyone was subordinate to the divine authority of the King.31 No one had the 
right to vote, participate in ruling, or any of the other political rights recognized 
in the United States today.32 As such, petitioning arose as the original, and for 
a time, the only protected means for subjects to seek limited political change.33 
While the subjects could not change or challenge their ruler's authority short of 
revolution, the right of petition allowed them to attempt to change the rules and 
how they were applied. Given the origins of the right and the important role it 
25. Mark, supra note 18, at 2177 (citation omitted). 
26. Id at2175. 
27. See Higginson, supra note 18, at 146-47. 
28. See Mark, supra note 18, at 2182-85. 
29. See id. at 2182-87. 
30. See id. 
3L See id. at 2164 ("Magna Carta is, however, hailed as the progenitor of English 
constitutional liberty because it came to provide a formal check on royal authority that could be 
exercised by other segments of English society as welL"). 
32. See id. at 2165. 
By requiring the petitioners to acknowledge the primacy of the king 's authority, even 
the barons ' petitions thus reinforced the hierarchy of the community to which all 
belonged. Although the barons' petitions could force the King's attention, their 
petitions .. . do not . .. immediately appear to have contained within themselves the 
empowering or dignity-enhancing features we today associate with the exercise of 
liberties. 
Id 
33. Cf Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 32 (" [P]etitions were the only authorized channel 
through which criticism of the government was funneled."). 
392 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:385 
played in English and colonial American history, it should not come as a surprise, 
therefore, that it was expressly included in the vast majority ofstate declarations 
ofrights, or that Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia, specifically 
insisted thatthe right be guaranteed when they ratified the Federal Constitution.34 
The debates surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment also 
demonstrate that the right maintained its significance even in the new republic. 
"The democratic experience of the Confederation period led not to a belief that 
petitioning was irrelevant, but instead renewed the question of whether, as it 
were, the ante should be upped. Should petitions become instructions rather than 
mere prayers?,,35 In the debates that ensued, Congress rejected the notion that the 
people should have the right to instruct their representatives, but reaffirmed the 
principle that their petitions must be respected. 
Instruction, then, was the enemy of deliberation, and not just because 
each state's or each district's parochialism might subvert the common, 
national good. Instruction also rendered deliberation superfluous 
because the representative could do only what his instructions mandated. 
Better, said the Federalists, to avoid this problem and take the advice and 
wisdom ofthe people through their speech and the press, and, when they 
assembled among themselves and conveyed their grievances, through the 
time-honored method ofpetition. Congress was meant to be not a "mere 
passive machine," but rather a "deliberative body." Petition would serve 
that end, instruction would destroy it.36 
In rejecting the right of instruction while embracing petitioning, Congress 
implicitly recognized that individuals, through petitioning, could command the 
government's attention, but not any particular result. In the early years, Congress 
put this understanding into practice as it "attempted to pass favorably or 
unfavorably on every petition ...,'>37 a practice which continued until the swell 
ofemancipation petitions overwhelmed Antebellum Congresses,38 and Americans 
had informally replaced the classical conception of petition and reciprocal 
obligation with "[b]rute political power grounded in the franchise.,,39 
2. The Promise.-Two features, the right to be heard and immunity, are 
central to the classical right of petition. Functionally, the right to petition "was 
an affirmative, remedial right which required governmental hearing and 
response.,,40 Petitioning was a means by which individuals could have the King, 
the Commons, colonial assemblies, state legislatures, Congress, and the courts 
redress private and public grievances.41 In England, the right represented "a 
34. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1174. 
35. Mark, supra note 18, at 2206. 
36. Id. at 2211-12 (footnotes omitted). 
37. Higginson, supra note 18, at 143 . 
38. See id. at 158-165; Mark, supra note 18, at 2212-26. 
39. Mark, supra note 18, at 2226. 
40. Higginson, supra note 18, at 142. 
41. See Mark, supra note 18, at 2168. 
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mechanism that bound the English together in a web of mutual obligation and 
acknowledgment of certain commonalities."42 The right 
reflected an element ofreciprocal obligation, embodying the recognition 
of hierarchy both in that every petition was a prayer to authority for the 
grace ofassistance as well as an implicit acknowledgment by the petition 
that the King ... had authority-that is, legitimate power-to resolve the 
complaint. In accepting the petition, the King, in turn, acknowledged a 
duty to subjects, one that had come to mean both hearing the complaint 
and not exercising power in an arbitrary fashion.43 
Likewise in colonial America: 
Petitioning provided not just a method whereby individuals .. . might 
seek reversal of harsh treatments by public authority, judicial or 
otherwise, but also a method whereby such individuals could seek the 
employment of public power to redress private wrongs that did not fit 
neatly into categories of action giving rise to a lawsuit. In that sense, 
even individual grievances embodied in petitions carried powerful 
political weight simply because of the individual's capacity to invoke 
public power.44 
Accordingly, the petition was a formal mechanism that allowed individuals to 
focus government attention on public or private issues of their choosing with a 
corresponding right to be considered. In other words, the right to petition 
allowed individuals to exert some control over legislative agendas.45 
Given the right's grounding in the principle that those who govern owe some 
duty to the governed, it is not surprising that petitioning's development is linked 
to the development of popular sovereignty both in England and the American 
colonies.46 While originally based upon the mutual obligations between the 
divine authority of the King and those he governed, grounded in the principles 
of natural hierarchy and deference to higher authority, petitioning evolved with 
the emergence ofpopular sovereignty.47 Madison described petitioning's role in 
the American Constitutional order as recognizing that "[t]he people may 
therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or 
declare their sentiment by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may 
communicate theirwill.,,48 Consequently, in the United States, petitions were no 
42. Id. at 2169. 
43. Id. 
44. ld. at 2182 (citations omitted). 
45 . See Higginson, supra note 18, at 142·54. 
46. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1180·81. 
47. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING TIm PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988) (discussing the history of popular sovereignty in 
England and the United States). 
48. Smith, supra note 18, at 1182 (quoting I ANNALS OF CONGo 738 (Joseph Gales ed., 
1789)). 
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longer "the prayers of supplicants, but the missives 'of a free people [to] their 
servants. ",49 
Supplementing the affirmative right to command government attention was 
the necessary corollary of the right-immunity from government prosecution. 
Beginning with the English petition in 1013 to Aethelred the Unready who 
promised not to retaliate against the petitioners, freedom from punishment has 
been one of the "central features of the history of petitioning.,,50 If the right to 
ask government to redress grievances, including grievances against the 
government, was to have any meaning, those exercising that right had to be 
immune from prosecution particularly for crimes against the state such as treason 
and sedition. 
While the history of petitioning records instances in both England and the 
United States in which petitioners were in fact prosecuted for petitioning, 
ultimately, those punished were generally released and their prosecution only 
served to provide greater recognition for the right.51 For example, in the Case of 
the Seven Bishops, the bishops petitioned James II asking to be relieved from his 
declaration that they read the Liberty of Conscience during their services, and 
were prosecuted for seditious libel. Not only were the bishops ultimately 
acquitted after their counsel argued that subjects have the right to petition the 
King, their prosecution "led directly to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and to . 
the Bill of Rights that fully confirmed the right of petition as an element of the 
British constitution [ sic]. ,,52 
Similarly, in the United States, of the seventeen cases prosecuted under the 
Alien and Sedition laws only one involved petitioning activity.53 Jedediah Peck 
was indicted under the Sedition Acf4 for circulating a petition to Congress 
advocating the repeal of the Alien and Sedition laws. Crowds of supporters not 
only cheered for him upon his arrest, public demonstrations-and pressure led the 
prosecution to drop the case.55 Following Peck's case, no other petitioners were 
indicted for challenging the constitutionality ofthose laws.56 In contrast, Thomas 
49. Mark, supra note 18, at 2205 (quoting Philadelphiensis, No. 5, reprinted in 3 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 116 (Herbert 1. Storing ed., 1981». 
50. Smith, supra note 18, at 1154-55. 
51. See jd. at 1162-66, 1175-77. 
52. Id. at 1160-61. 
53 . See jd. at 1176. 
54. The Sedition Act 
[M]ade it a crime, punishable by a $5000 fine and five years in prison, if any person 
shall write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious writing or 
writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress 
., or the President ... , with intent to defame .. . or to bring them, or either of them, 
into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred 
of the good people of the United States. 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-74 (1964) (quoting 1 Stat. 596 (1798». 
55 . See Smith, supra note 18, at 1176. 
56. See jd. at 1177. 
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Jefferson had to issue a presidential pardon for those convicted based upon their 
speech,57 and it was almost 200 years before the United States Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized that the Sedition laws violated principles offree speech.58 
Therefore, even during eras and regimes in which speech was prosecuted and the 
press thoroughly regulated, petitioning was afforded significantly greater 
protection.59 Consequently, the classical right to petition operated both as a 
sword to invoke public power and a shield to protect against government 
prosecution. 
3. The Historical Limits.-Even classical petitioning, however, was not 
without its limits. Because the classical right to petition imposed upon 
government formal obligations to hear the petition and refrain from prosecuting 
the petitioners, petitions had to be differentiated from other forms of 
communication. As Professor Mark has noted: 
A petition was the beginning of an official action, part of a "course of 
justice," not just a passing of information, even though the conveying of 
information to the proper authority was a powerful justification for 
petitions. Just as a claim brought in court required submission in a 
certain manner, so did a complaint brought by petition, even if the forms 
required ofpetitioners never quite equalled [sic] in puncti Iiousness those 
required of plaintiffs at common law.60 
As developed in English law, therefore, "[a] petition was a communication that, 
1) had to be addressed to an authority such as the King, 2) had to state a 
grievance, and, 3) had to pray for relief.,,61 Petitions had to have "petitionary 
parts,,62 and had to be signed by those "legitimately allowed to request a redress 
of grievances.,,63 Parliament also placed limits on the number of signatures that 
could appear on a petition and on the number of individuals allowed to present 
it.64 According to Blackstone, these restrictions were justified "as a means of 
avoiding riots or disruptive presentation of petitions.'>65 
The English were not the only ones to place restrictions on the right to 
petition; the American colonies also placed limited restrictions upon the right. 
In colonial America, colonial assemblies adopted rules and regulations punishing 
57. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 276. 
58. See id. ("Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its 
validity has carried the day in the court ofhistory.... These views reflect a broad consensus that 
the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was 
inconsistent with the First Amendment."). 
59. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1168-69; Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 34-40. 
60. Mark, supra note 18, at 2174 (citations omitted). 
61. ld. at2173. 
62. Id. at 2228 n.358. 
63. Id. at 2220. 
64. See Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 27. 
65 . Id. at 26-27 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 138-39 (Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1979»). 
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the filing ofmeritless petitions.66 Under these rules, the petitioner could be fined 
and made to bear the cost of filing the meritless petition.67 These limitations, 
however, were not intended or applied to punish individuals based upon the 
viewpoints expressed in the petitions. Instead, they were attempts to ensure "that 
petitions with merit would be heard while individuals would be protected from 
defending baseless actions.,,68 Despite these limitations, as the principal means 
for criticizing government and seeking political change, the classical right to 
petition was one of the most important rights of its time. 
B. The Noerr Doctrine 
In the context ofantitrust law, the development ofthe right to petition begins 
with Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,69 in 
which the Supreme Court considered whether the Sherman Act should be applied 
to a publicity and lobbying effort conducted by twenty-four railroads to restrict 
competition from the trucking industry.70 The railroads carried out their 
campaign through deceptive and unethical ineans with the sole aim of pursuing 
legislation that would destroy the trucking competition. 71 However, because "the 
railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law 
enforcement practices," the Court held that their conduct was absolutely immune 
from antitrust liability.72 
Writing for the Court, Justice Black emphasized that there is an "essential 
dissimilarity" between agreements to petition for laws that would restrain trade 
and private agreements that directly restrain trade, and that to condemn the 
lobbying effort "would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not 
business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis 
whatever in the legislative history ofthat Act.,,73 A contrary conclusion "would 
raise important constitutional questions,,,74 as the "right of petition is one of the 
freedoms protected by the Bill ofRights, and we cannot, ofcourse, lightly impute 
to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms .,,75 
In reaching this conclusion the Court recognized the structural importance 
ofthe right to petition. In a representative democracy, government represents the 
will ofthe people. Ifthe people cannot make their wishes known to their agents, 
especially when they seek changes to the existing legal order, government would 
66. See id. at 31. 
67 . See id. 
68. Id. 
69. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 129. 
72. Id. at 144-45 . 
73. Id. at 136-37. 
74 , Jd. at 138. 
75. Id. 
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no longer represent the people in their sovereign capacity.76 "In a representative 
democracy such as this, these branches ofgovernment act on behalf ofthe people 
and, to a very large extent, the whole concept ofrepresentation depends upon the 
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives.,>77 
Punishing individuals for efforts to "influence the passage or enforcement of 
laws" even by the deceptive publicity adopted by the railroads, therefore, would 
be inconsistent with the principles of free government. 78 
The Court, however, was unwilling to immunize any and all efforts to 
influence government. The Court cautioned that "[t]here may be situations in 
which a ... campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental 
action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the 
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.,,79 Widely known as the 
"sham" exception, the Court's reservation has been the subject of extensive 
discussion notably for the Court's failure, until recently, to provide any 
additional guidance as to what sorts of activities fell within the exception.80 
In a series ofdecisions, following Noerr Motor Freight, the Supreme Court 
extended immunity from antitrust liability to attempts to influence members of 
the executive branch of government as well as the judiciary. In United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington,8! the Court concluded that Noerr applied to the efforts 
of large coal mine operators and the United Mine Workers to persuade the 
Secretary of Labor to establish a higher minimum wage and convincing the 
Tennessee Valley Authority to curtail certain market purchases in order to 
eliminate smaller competitors.82 The Court held that "moint efforts to influence 
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to 
eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as 
part of a broader scheme violative of the Sherman Act. ,,83 
Subsequently, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,84 
the Court concluded that: 
76. See id. at 137. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 140-41 ("[A] publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into 
the category of political activity."). 
79. Id. at 144 (emphasis added). 
80. See, e.g., Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations o~oerr-Pennington and the Burden of 
Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional Argument in Favor ofa "Clear and 
Convincing" Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681 (1994); Milton Handler & Richard A. De Sevo, The 
Noerr Doctrine andIts Sham Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1984); James B. Perrine, Comment, 
Defining the "Sham Litigation" Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine: 
An AnalysiS ofthe Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries Decision, 46 
ALA.L. REv. 815 (1995). 
81. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
82. See id. at 660. 
83. Id. at 670. 
84. 404 U.S . 508 (1972). 
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[I]t would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold 
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the 
antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal 
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view 
respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis 
their competitors.8s 
"Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. 
The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of 
petition.,,86 However, despite reaching that conclusion, the Court found that the 
alleged conduct would fall outside Noerr protection under the "sham" 
exception.87 The controversy in California Motor Transport was between 
intrastate and interstate trucking firms in which the interstate firms allegedly 
conspired to oppose all applications filed by the intrastate firms for operating 
rights before the California Public Utilities Commission or the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.88 According to the Court, "[A] pattern of baseless, 
repetitive claims .. . effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies 
and courts" would not qualify for immunity under the "umbrella of 'political 
expression.",89 . 
Following its initial trilogy, the Court has taken some steps to define what 
it meant by "sham." Based on the Supreme Court's decisions, the sham 
exception became a catchall limit to petitioning immunity.90 Lack of a clear 
definition led primarily to a split over the extent to which the petitioning party's 
intent could form the basis for denying immunity.91 For example, Judge Posner 
concluded that even lawsuits presenting colorable claims could constitute sham 
conduct if the principal aim in bringing to suit was to burden competitors with 
the cost of litigation regardless of the outcome of the case.92 In contrast, the 
Sixth Circuit ruled that the "sham exception does not apply merely because a 
party files a suit with the principle purpose of harming his competitor.,,93 In its 
initial response, the Court made clear that private activity can only be considered 
a sham if it is "not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action."94 
85. Id. at 510-11. 
86. [d. at 510. 
87. See id. at 511-12. 
88. See id. at 509. 
89. ld. at 513 . 
90. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw~ 203. I a, at 19 (1996 
Supp.) ("Some courts and commentators use it as a catchall for any activity that is not afforded 
Noerr protection."); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 80 (employing expansive definition of sham). 
91. See ALD, supra note 6, at 1002-05. 
92. See Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983). 
93. Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035 
( 1987). 
94. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4 (1988). 
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Subsequently, the Court finally provided a definitive definition for what 
constitutes a "sham" in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc.95 The Court adopted a two-part test: 
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. Ifan 
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to 
elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an 
antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if 
challenged litigation is objectively meritless maya court examine the 
litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part ofour definition 
ofsham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals 
"an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor" ... through the "use [of] governmental process-as opposed 
to the outcome ofthat process-as an anticompetitive weapon.96 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court clarified that Noerr immunity protects all 
objectively reasonable acts of petitioning government regardless of intent. 
Lastly, in addition to protecting the "act" of petitioning itself, courts 
recognize that Noerr immunity protects what can be described as "incidental" 
acts associated with "a valid effort to influence governmental action.,,97 For 
example, the Supreme Court in Noerr Motor Freight concluded that even the 
deceptive advertising aimed at the public could not form the basis for antitrust 
liability because it was "incidental" to a valid effort to solicit government 
action.98 Along these lines, in the context oflitigation, courts have held that the 
decision not to settle a law suit could not form an independent basis for antitrust 
liability,99 nor could the publicity associated with a lawsuit. 100 
The application ofpetitioning immunity to all three branches ofgovernment 
is consistent with the classical right to petition. 101 As discussed above, one ofthe 
primary protections offered by the right to petition was immunity from formal 
95. 508 u.s. 49 (1993). 
96. ld. at 60-61 (citations omitted). 
97. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499. 
98. ld. at 505. 
99. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 
1525, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1991). 
100. See Aircapital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communications Group, 634 F. Supp. 316, 
324 (D. Kansas 1986) (holding that publicity associated with an antitrust lawsuit could not form 
the basis for antitrust liability). 
101. But see McGowan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 384-89 (arguing that the right to petition 
should not apply to the courts). McGowan & Lemley's argument, however, overlooks the fact that 
historically the right to petition was recognized as applying to the judiciary. Moreover, their 
argument overlooks that functionally and occasionally in name as well, pleadings filed with courts 
are the closest example of classical petitioning as they not only ask "government for the redress of 
grievances" but they command its attention as well. 
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efforts to invoke governmental power. 102 As petitions could be filed with the 
King, legislatures, or courts, immunity followed in all three contexts. 
Historically, the right was recognized by each of the branches as an effort to 
draw more power unto themselves.103 Its modern day application is consistent 
with the principle of popular sovereignty and that all three branches of 
government are subordinate to and agents of the sovereign people. I04 This 
conclusion is also consistent with the drafting of the First Amendment. The 
original draft stated, "The people shall not be restrained ... from applying to the 
legislatures by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.,,105 
The Senate rewrote the petition language with perhaps the most significant 
change being the replacement of "Legislature" with "Government."I06 By 
replacing legislature with government, Congress clearly intended that the right 
should apply to all three branches. Consequently, the Supreme Court's 
development of the right under Noerr is consistent with the right's Anglo­
American history. 
The Supreme Court's treatment ofthe right to petition does differ, however, 
from the classical right in one important aspect: as the preceding decisions 
demonstrate, the Court has extended immunity beyond the formal act ofwritten 
petitioning itself to what can be described as informal petitioning. 107 With the 
exception of California Motor Transport in which the defendants had in fact . 
filed formal "petitions" in the form of court documents,108 neither Noerr Motor 
Freight nor Pennington involved formal written petitions to the governmental 
bodies at issue. Instead, they dealt primarily with lobbying and other informal 
avenues of political persuasion. In Noerr, for example, the primary conduct 
immunized by the Court was a deceptive public relations campaign designed to 
\02. See supra Part 1.A.2. 
103. See Mark, supra note 18, at 2191; Higginson, supra note 18, at 150-53. 
104. See generally MORGAN, supra note 47 (describing the differences in popular sovereignty 
between England and the United States); Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The 
LegjtimacyofConstitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 535, 547-57 (1995)(discussing the role 
ofpopular sovereignty in creating a Constitutional scheme of government). See also Smith, supra 
note 18, at 1177 (noting that Madison critiqued the Alien and Sedition laws as "retreating toward 
the exploded doctrine that the administrators ofthe Government are the masters and not the servants 
of the people") (citation omitted). 
105. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 1789-1791 , at 10,16 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986). 
106. See Smith supra note 18, at 1175; Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 40. 
107. The extension of petitioning immunity to encompass informal acts of petitioning is in 
part responsible for the doctrinal confusion surrounding Noerr. Ifthe court had concluded that the 
right to petition protected only the formal act ofsubmitting a classical petition, it would be a simple 
matter to determine whether the right was implicated or not. By also protecting informal acts, it is 
now necessary to come up with a means to distinguish between informal acts of petitioning and 
other non-protected conduct. To date, the Court has failed to clearly articulate a method for making 
such a determination. 
108. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,511 (1972). 
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influence Pennsylvania's Governor, Legislature, and people,l09 while, in 
Pennington, the immunized conduct was the lobbying of the Secretary of Labor 
and the Tennessee Valley Authority.IJO More recently, the Court has recognized 
that even letters to the President of the United States could be considered 
protected under the right to petition. II I However, according to Justice Douglas, 
the right "is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a 
congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the local city council, or 
writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor.,,112 
This extension of petitioning immunity beyond formal acts of petitioning is 
consistent with the adoption of the First Amendment. For example, James 
Madison, who is often considered one of the principal architects behind the 
petitioning clause of the First Amendment, 113 noted in the debates over whether 
the people should have a right to instruct their representatives that "[t]he people 
may [instead] publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, 
or declare their sentiment by petitions to the whole body; in all these ways they 
may communicate their will.,,114 In this statement, Madison explicitly recognized 
that the people's right extended beyond formal petitioning to informal acts such 
as publicly addressing them or privately advising them. 
The protection of informal acts ofpetitioning is also consistent with current 
State recognition ofpetitioning. For example, a growing num ber ofstates protect 
individuals from SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation). 115 SLAPP suits are lawsuits brought in retaliation for the 
defendant's attempt to influence governmental action by, for example, testifying 
at a public hearing to have property rezoned to the disadvantage of the 
plaintiff. 116 As such they clearly implicate the right to petition as efforts to 
punish individuals for exercising that right. 117 The legislative response to such 
109. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 130­
33 (1961). 
110. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659-60 (1965). 

II J. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985). 

112. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
113 . See Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 39-40; Higginson, supra note 18, at 155-56. 
114. Smith, supra note 18, at 1182(quoting 1 ANNALSOFCONG. 738(1789» . 
115. See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC'y REv. 385 (1988) 
(coining the term SLAPP suits); Aaron R. Gary, First Amendment Petition Clause Immunity from 
Tort Suits: In Search ofa Consistent Doctrinal Framework, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 67, 131 (1996) 
(noting that SLAPP suits are a growing public concern). Currently, eight states have statutes 
protecting individuals from SLAPP suits. See generally LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50 
STATE SURVEY 1998-99: MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW (1998). 
116. See Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-25 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("A 
SLAPP suit is one filed by developers, unhappy with public protest over a propose development, 
filed against leading critics in order to silence criticism of the proposed development."). 
117. See id. at 526 (holding that defendant in SLAPP suit was immune from liability under 
the right to petition). 
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suits is typically to establish a procedure for the early dismissal of such suits and 
for the imposition of costs upon the plaintiff. 118 In defining the exercise of the 
right to petition, Massachusetts, for example, includes: 
[A]ny written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any 
written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 
any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to 
encourage consideration or review ofan issue by a legislative, executive, 
or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any statement 
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such 
consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional 
protection of the right to petition govemment. 119 
The need to protect informal acts of petitioning is, therefore, recognized by the 
States as well. 
The protection of informal acts ofpetitioning, however, is in part responsible 
for the confusion surrounding the current attitude towards petitioning because it 
blurs the line between petitioning and speech. As discussed above, when the 
right to petition has been invoked by the Supreme Court, more often than not it . 
is in the same breath as freedom of speech. 120 In fact, the Court has stated that 
"[t]he right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees ofthat 
Amendment, and is an assurance ofa particular freedom ofexpression.,,121 This 
confusion is understandable because some types ofpublicity and public relations 
campaigns are considered "petitioning" and not simply speech.122 Moreover, it 
is also understandable given that the right to petition is no longer the only 
protected avenue for seeking political change or criticizing government. The 
First Amendment now guarantees a wider range of freedom of expression than 
was recognized during petitioning's golden era. Likewise, the rise of popular 
118. 	 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 231, § 59h (West. Supp. 1999). 
In any case in which a party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims 
against said party are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition under the 
constitution ofthe United States or ofthe commonwealth, said party may bring a special 
motion to dismiss. The court shall advance any such special motion so that it may be 
heard and determined as expeditiously as possible. The court shall grant such special 
motion, unless the party against whom such special motion is made shows that: (I) that 
the moving party's exercise of its right to petition was devoid ofany reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law and (2) that the moving party's acts caused actual 
injury to the responding party ... 
fd. 
119. fd. 
120. See Rydstrom, supra note 18. 
121. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). 
122. But see Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 66 (arguing that the extension of petitioning 
immunity to such efforts is overinclusive). 
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sovereignty and universal suffrage broadened the accepted means for political 
participation. The extension of these other rights, however, should not obscure 
petitioning's continued importance. The right to petition remains the principal 
textual guarantee ofthe individual's right directly to seek government action and 
for immunity from prosecution for those efforts. 
C. The Problem 
Against this backdrop, an argument could be made that parties involved in 
an objectively reasonable lawsuit who enter into a settlement agreement with 
anticompetitive consequences, are nonetheless, immune because the agreement 
is incidental to their Constitutionally protected right to petition the government 
for redress. In making this argument, litigants would find support in the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real 
Estate Investors, Inc.123 In that case, the court held that "[a] decision to accept 
or reject an offer ofsettlement is conduct incidental to the prosecution ofthe suit 
and not a separate and distinct activity which might form the basis for antitrust 
liability.,,124 So long as the litigation itself is not a sham and entitled to 
immunity, any settlement would likewise be immune. 
Second, litigants could point to the fact that, as a general rule, the antitrust 
laws do not preclude settlement by agreement rather than by litigation,125 and 
emphasize the "general policy favoring settlement of litigation.,,126 Lastly, at 
least one commentator has argued that "[t]oo great a willingness to find antitrust 
violations in settlement arrangements would significantly inhibit settlements of 
many types of cases at real cost to the administration of justice, with little 
Iikel ihood ofany countervai I ing benefit to the pubIic interest."127 I n other words, 
denying immunity in the context of settlements would impose significant costs 
upon society either through the increased transaction costs associated with 
litigation or by limiting the ability ofprivate actors to order their affairs. Despite 
the facial plausibility of this argument, a more probing examination of the right 
to petition reveals that the settlement of litigation is not the sort of activity that 
the right protects. 
II. DEFINrNG THE SCOPE OF PETITIONrNG IMMUNITY 
In order to determine whether the settlement of litigation is an activity that 
falls outside the protection of the First Amendment's right to petition, an 
understanding of the scope and limits of petitioning immunity is necessary. 
However, as noted by numerous commentators, this area of law is replete with 
123. 944 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991). 
124. ld. at 1528. 
125. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931). 
126. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963) (White, J., concurring); 
Dore, supra note 16, at 290-91 . But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlements, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 
(\ 984) (criticizing the movement towards alternative dispute resolution). 
127. Reasoner & Adler, supra note 8, at 126. 
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"doctrinal confusion,,128 as a result of the Supreme Court's "failure to set forth 
clear general rules for defining the scope of the immunity.,,129 Currently, the 
clearest guidance provided by the Court is that the scope of Noerr immunity 
depends upon "the source, context, and nature ofthe anticompetitive restraint at 
issue.,,13o In dissent, Justice White noted that under this rule, "[D]istrict courts 
and courts of appeals will be obliged to puzzle over claims raised under the 
doctrine without any intelligible guidance about when and why to apply it."I3! 
To flesh out this rule, this section examines the underlying premises ofthe Noerr 
doctrine and articulates some general rules and a methodology for determining 
the scope of petitioning immunity. 
Despite the general ambiguity surrounding Noerr, the history of the right to 
petition and the Supreme Court's case law demonstrate that immunity is justified 
based upon the nature of the activity in question and the source of the injury to 
competition. This Article proposes that immunity attaches when: 
1) the conduct represents valid petitioning. Valid petitioning is defined 
as a formal or informal attempt to persuade an independent governmental 
decision maker consistent with the rules of the political forum in 
question, and 
2) any anticompetitive harms flow directly or indirectly from those 
persuasive efforts. 
Under this means/source test, the Supreme Court recognizes that: I) individuals 
have a constitutional right to petition government for any end, and 2) the antitrust 
laws do not apply when restraints upon trade are a) the result of government 
action, or b) result directly from the act ofpetitioning. 132 Immunity under Noerr 
is justified in circumstances in which both ofprongs ofthe means/source test are 
satisfied. 133 Moreover, if these requirements are not satisfied, conduct is not 
immune even if "genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,,134 
and therefore not a sham.135 
128. E.g., McGowan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 298. 
129. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1178. 
130. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S . 492, 499 (1988). 
131. Id. at 513 (White, 1., dissenting). 
132. See discussion infra Part ILA & Part II.B. 
133 . See discussion infra Part ILA & Part II .B. 
134. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 n.4. Additionally, Noerr immunity is based implicitly on 
at least two assumptions. First, the process in which the anticompetitive result is being advocated 
is open to all sides. Second and closely related to the first, the outcome ofthe alleged ly immunized 
activity must be subject to revision and reconsideration. Both of these assumptions are closely 
rooted to the political nature of the right. Harm to competition cannot be legitimately attributed to 
government, if those who are injured or simply oppose the "harm" do not have an avenue for being 
heard , and government cannot subsequently alter the outcome if it is inconsistent with the public 
good or any other reason. 
135. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45. 
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A. TheMeans 
Logically, the first step in determining whether the challenged activity is 
insulated under the First Amendment's right to petition is to determine whether 
the activity can be considered protected petitioning. '36 Historically, this would 
have meant a formal act of submitting a petition to a governmental body, in the 
appropriately deferential tone, seeking the redress of some public or private 
issue, separate from the cognate acts ofspeech and assembly. 137 However, as the 
prior summary of the Supreme Court's original trilogy in this area reveals, the 
Court has recognized that petitioning encompasses other means of 
communication in addition to the formal act of petitioning in the 18th century 
sense. 138 The right to petition extends to all valid efforts to solicit "governmental 
action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws" whether they be 
formal or informal. 139 The threshold inquiry under Noerr, therefore, requires a 
determination that the private conduct represents an effort to solicit government 
action and that the means employed are considered valid. '40 
Atthe outset it should be noted that determining whether the means are valid 
and therefore protected petitioning is not necessarily equivalent to determining 
whether the motives are genuine. If private action is not genuinely aimed at 
soliciting governmental action, it is considered a sham, and therefore unprotected 
by the First Amendment even if the means utilized would otherwise be 
considered valid for purposes of petitioning. 141 Correspondingly, however, a 
genuine motive to "procure favorable governmental action" will not insulate 
private action if the means employed are not protected. As the Supreme Court 
made clear in Allied Tube and Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court 
136. Some commentators and courts have treated this question as a determination into 
whether the conduct in question is a sham. See, e.g., AREEDA&HOVENKAMP,supra note 90, at 19 
("Some courts and commentators use [sham] as a catchall for any activity that is not afforded Noerr 
protection."); Minda, supra note 10, at 1013-15 (arguing for the sham exception to include methods 
that distort the deliberative process ofgovernment). However, as discussed earlier, sham conduct 
has been narrowly defined to circumstances in which the private actor does not genuinely intend 
to secure governmental assistance. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. Accordingly, 
the sham category is both over inclusive and underinclusive. Moreover, it fails to provide any 
substantive guidance into what activities should be protected under the First Amendment. 
137. See supra Part 1.A; see also Mark, supra note 18, at 2170-74. 
138. See supra text accompanying notes 107-19. 
139. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 
(1961). 
140. See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1215-23 (noting the need to determine whether the 
restraint is incidental and valid) (relying upon Allied Tube). 
141. See Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
60 (1992) (defining sham); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indiana Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 
n.4 (1988). 
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Trial Lawyers Ass 'n, 142 protection under the right to petition may be denied even 
if the conduct in question was, in fact, intended and successfully results in 
government action. 14J 
But what exactly is protected petitioning? What means for soliciting 
government action are valid? As the following discussion demonstrates, the 
method for determining whether private conduct represents valid petitioning is 
a two step process. First, courts must determine the "nature" of the conduct in 
question-is the conduct primarily an effort to persuade an independent 
governmental decision-maker? If so, the next step is to determine whether that 
conduct is otherwise permissible within the rules of the political arena in which 
the petitioning is occurring without reference to antitrust. 144 Specific conduct 
that is considered acceptable varies depending upon whether the legislative, 
executive, or judicial branches are involved. Therefore, as the Supreme Court 
has recognized, context is crucial. A detailed analysis ofcases from the Supreme 
Court's original trilogy as well as subsequent cases brings this initial two part 
inquiry into sharper focus. 
1. Is the Petitioning Valid?-As discussed earlier, the Noerr Motor Freight 
decision examined the struggle between railroads and the heavy trucking 
industry. The trucking industry contended that the railroads conspired "to 
conduct a pUblicity campaign against the truckers designed to foster the adoption 
and retention of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking 
business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general 
public, and to impair the relationships existing between the truckers and their 
customers.,,145 The complaint alleged that this campaign was conducted through 
unethical and fraudulent means including the circulation of material which 
appeared to be spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and 
groups when, in fact, they were produced by and for the railroads. '46 The 
truckers claimed that, as a result of this conduct, they sustained damages in the 
form of lost revenue when the Governor of Pennsylvania vetoed legislation 
favorable to trucking and by incurring costs in responding to the publicity 
effort.147 In response, the railroad counter-claimed, among other things, that the 
truckers engaged in similar publicity and through similarly unethical and 
fraudulent means. 148 Despite finding that both sides had engaged in similarly 
deceptive publicity, the trial court found for the truckers and against the rai Iroad 
based upon evidence that the railroads intended to harm trucking while the 
truckers were merely seeking self-serving legislation. '49 
142. 493 U.S . 411 (1990). 
143. See infra text accompanying notes 188-225. 
144. Cf AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, at 73-82; E1hauge, supra note 9, at 1223-35. 
145. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129 
(1961). 
146. See id. at 130. 
147. See id. at 130-31. 
148. See id. at 132. 
149. See id. at 134. 
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In finding the railroads' conduct immunized from antitrust scrutiny, the Court 
began with the proposition that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be 
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of 
laws.,,15o The Court noted that: 
In a representative democracy such as this, [the] branches ofgovernment 
act on behalf ofthe people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept 
of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their 
wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government 
retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at 
the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of 
their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not 
business activity, but political activity .... 151 
Accordingly, with due consideration for the right to petition, the Court held that 
"activities [which] comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with 
respect to the passage and enforcement oflaws" would be immune from antitrust 
scrutiny.152 Because there was no question in Noerr that the "nature" of the 
railroads' activities, the publicity campaign, was in fact an effort to influence 
governmental decision-making (an effort that was at least in part a successful), 
the Court was not confronted with whether petitioning was involved. As the 
Court noted in its subsequent decision in Pennington, the evidence in Noerr 
Motor Freight consisted "entirely of activities of competitors seeking to 
influence public officials.,,153 However, that did not end the inquiry, and the 
decision went on to address whether the intent behind the petition and the means 
employed were "sufficient to take the case out ofthe area in which the principle 
is controlling.,,154 
First, the Court rejected the district court's conclusion that the railroads ' 
purpose ofseeking to destroy their competition through legislation was somehow 
impermissible. According to the Court: 
The right ofthe people to inform their representatives in government of 
their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of hiws cannot 
properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither 
unusual or illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they 
may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their 
competitors. 155 
This passage is important because the Court found that no rules or laws outside 
of antitrust prohibited petitioning based upon the intent of the petition, and 
therefore, a "bad motive" would not be sufficient to remove immunity for the 
150. [d. at 135. 
151. Id at 137. 
152. [d. at 138. 
153 . United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). 
154. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 138. 
155 . [d. at 139. 
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railroads' petitioning activity.ls6 
Next, the Court went on to reject the contention that the "deception" 
involved in the publicity campaign was sufficient to subject the conduct to 
antitrust scrutiny. While the Court found the practices to fall "far short of the 
ethical standards generally approved in this country," the technique employed by 
the railroads (and the trucking industry) was apparently "in widespread use 
among practitioners of the art of public relations" at the time. ls7 Once again, in 
the absence of any rule prohibiting the use of the so called "third-party 
technique," the Shennan Act could not prohibit such conduct. To use the Court's 
language, "Insofar as that Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that 
condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as we have already pointed 
out, a publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into the 
. category ofpolitical activity."ls8 Accordingly, beginning with Noerr, the Court 
examined both whether the conduct in question could be considered petitioning, 
and if so whether the petitioning activity was consistent with the rules of the 
"political arena" in which it occurred. 
Following Noerr, the Court next examined the means of petitioning in two 
cases involving the judicial arena: Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food 
Machinery & Chemical Corp. 159 and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited. l60 Unfortunately, neither opinion is very detailed, and both fail to . 
provide a coherent explanation for why petitioning immunity was denied in each 
instance. Nonetheless, both decisions can be readily explained by the fact that 
the petitioning conduct, the filing of a lawsuit, violated rules and norms within 
the judicial arena without reference to antitrust laws. 
Rather than concluding that the truckers' litigation efforts were a sham, 
California Motor Transport is better understood as recognizing that while their 
conduct represented petitioning, it was invalid petitioning under the rules 
governing adjudication. As discussed earlier, California Motor Transport, 
involved allegations that certain trucking companies had violated the Clayton Act 
by conspiring to "institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat 
applications" by their competitors to acquire competing trucking rights.161 In that 
decision, the Supreme Court made clear that access to courts and administrative 
agencies were clearly protected by the right to petition. 162 Despite that 
conclusion, the Court nonetheless found against the interstate truckers for filing 
their claims against the intrastate truckers even though they had a "right ofaccess 
to the agencies and courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive 
156. In so doing, the Court also appears to imply that even if such a rule did exist it would 
impermissibly interfere with the right to petition. See id. 
157 . Id. at 140. 
158. Id. at 140-41. 
159. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
160. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
161. Id. at 509. 
162. See id. at 510. 
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highway carriers.,,163 
Nominally, the Court concluded that because the complaint alleged that the 
interstate truckers instituted proceedings "with or without probable cause, and 
regardless ofthe merits ofthe cases,,,I64 the alleged conduct fell within the sham 
exception. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the 
truckers had been successful in the majority oftheir challenges winning twenty­
one out of forty cases. 165 Given the defendant's successes, as Professor Elhauge 
observed, "[I]t could not be denied that the suits were genuine efforts to 
influence adjudicators."I66 Nor could it be argued that the claims raised were 
objectively without merit as required under the Supreme Court's most recent 
definition of sham. 167 Accordingly, the conduct in California Motor does not 
satisfY the doctrinal definition of sham as it is understood today. 
California Motor can best be understood as concluding that whi Ie the means 
used by the defendants were unquestionably petitioning, as alleged they could 
nonetheless be considered invalid under the rules of administrative and judicial 
proceedings. In an effort to distinguish the fact that in Noerr the railroads used 
deception, misrepresentation, and unethical tactics to secure favorable 
legislation, the Court emphasized the context of the activity at issue. While 
unethical conduct may be permitted in the political arena, "unethical conduct in 
the setting of the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions.,,168 For 
example, "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not 
immunized when used in the adjudicatory process.,,169 While California Motor 
did not involve perjury or other misrepresentations, it potentially involved the 
common law tort of abuse of process which would be impermissible without 
reference to antitrust laws or principles. 170 Because conduct such as perjury, 
fraud, and abuse of process are prohibited in the judicial arena, they "cannot 
acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of 'political 
expression. ",171 In other words, conduct inconsistent with the rules governing 
adjudicative proceedings would not be considered valid or protected petitioning 
activity. 
Similarly in Walker Process, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
maintenance and enforcement ofa patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office 
163. ld.at513. 
164. Jd. at 512. 
165. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 1967 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 
72,298, at 84,744 (N.D. Cal.), rev 'd on other grounds, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), af{'d on other 
grounds, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
166. E1hauge, supra note 9, at 1184. 
167. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. , 508 U.S. 49, 
60-61 (1993). 
168. California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 512. 
169. ld.at513 . 
170. See id. 
171. Id. at 513. 
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could form the basis for a Sherman Act violation. 172 In finding that the antitrust 
claim could proceed, the Court relied upon a well established body ofpatent law 
involving the invalidity of patents procured by fraud which recognizes that the 
validity of patents is always subject to attack.173 "The far-reaching social and 
economic consequences of a patent ... give the public a paramount interest in 
seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other 
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate 
scope.,,174 Consequently, the Court concluded that if the plaintiff, Food 
Machinery, obtained its patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts 
to the Patent Office, it would not be immune from the antitrust laws. 175 "By the 
same token, Food Machinery's good faith would furnish a complete defense.,,176 
In the former case, a plaintiff knows or should know that the patent is invalid as 
a matter of law and, therefore, subsequent efforts to maintain and enforce that 
patent against others would have no objective legal basis. While some may label 
this conduct a sham 177 because the plaintiff would certainly be seeking 
government action in its favor (Le., the enforcement of the patent against a 
competitor), denial of immunity is better understood as based upon the 
unprotected status ofthe alleged petitioning conduct. Accordingly, even though 
the Court's decision does not even mention Noerr, its conclusion is consistent 
with the principle that petitioning immunity only attaches when the petitioning · 
conduct is considered valid. 
Outside the context ofantitrust, the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald 
v. Smith l78 is also consistent with examining whether the challenged petitioning 
conduct was considered valid. The defendant in McDonald sent letters to 
President Reagan, Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese, Senator Jesse Helms, and 
other public officials opposing the plaintiffs consideration for the position of 
United States Attomey.179 The letters accused the plaintiff ofviolating the civil 
rights of individuals while serving as a state court judge, committing fraud, 
conspiring to commit fraud, extortion and blackmail, and other violations of 
professional ethics. 180 Following the rejection of his nomination, the plaintiff 
sued for Iibel. 181 
On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the 
statements made in the defendant's letters should be entitled to absolute 
172. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173 (\965). 
173. See id at 176-77. 
J74. Id at 177 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. 
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). 
175. See id 
176. Id 
177. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 204.1, at 74-76; Minda, supra note 10, 
at 971-72. 
178. 472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
179. Seeidat481. 
180. See id 

18 L See id 
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immunity or subject to the qualified immunity afforded by the constitutional 
malice standard recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 182 In determining 
the scope of immunity to be afforded to the defendant's petitioning efforts, the 
Court began by noting the historical significance of the right and that it "is 
implicit in' [t]he very idea ofgovernment, repUblican in form. ",183 The historical 
importance of the right, however, was not dispositive. 184 Instead, the Court 
examined whether the common law ofdefamation recognized absolute immunity 
for letters to public officials, noting that the authorities on that subject were 
mixed and that it had rejected a claim for absolute immunity in a prior 
defamation decision. 185 In light of this case law, the Court concluded that 
absolute immunity was not justified, and that the statements made in the letters 
could lead to liability if the plaintiff satisfied the New York Times standard and 
demonstrated that they were made with knowing or reckless disregard for the 
truth. 186 In support of its conclusion that some limitations on petitioning are 
legitimate, the Court relied on its "decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in 
contexts other than defamation" including California Motor Transport which did 
not "indicate that the right to petition is absolute.,,18? 
2. Is the Conduct Petitioning?-In the preceding cases the nature of the 
private conduct was admittedly petitioning activity: lobbying, a publicity 
campaign directed at public officials, the filing of lawsuits, and instituting 
administrative proceedings. The question, therefore, was whether those 
petitioning activities were conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures 
of the petitioning forum, and, therefore, valid. In the following two cases, the 
Supreme Court confronted which types of conduct could in fact be considered 
petitioning, let alone valid petitioning. 
In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,188 manufacturers of 
steel conduits used to house electrical wiring conspired with other steel interests 
to exclude plastic conduits from the National Electric Code. The Code, 
published by the National Fire Protection Association (a private organization 
representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters, 
and government), establishes product and performance requirements for 
electrical wiring. 189 State and local governments routinely adopted the Code with 
182. See id. at 481-82. 
183 . Id. at 482-83 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)). 
184. See id. at 483 ("Although the values in the right of petition as an important aspect of 
self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment 
believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for libeL"). 
185. See id. at 483-84. But see Smith, supra note 18, at 1183 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court's analysis was flawed and that common law did recognize absolute immunity for letters to 
public officials); Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 52-58 (same). 
186. See id. at 485 ("The right to petition is guaranteed; the right to commit libel with 
impunity is not."). 
187. Id. at 484 . 

188 486 U.S. 492, 497 (1988). 

189. See id. at 495. 
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little or no revisions, and private industry often required electrical products to be 
consistent with the Code. 190 
The controversy began when manufacturers of plastic conduits sought to 
have their conduits included as an approved type ofelectrical conduit in the 1981 
edition of the Code. As described by the Supreme Court: 
Alarmed that, if approved, respondent's product might pose a 
competitive threat to steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation's largest 
producer of steel conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others, 
members ofthe steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its 
independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude 
respondent's product from the 1981 Code by packing the upcoming 
annual meeting with new Association members whose only function 
would be to vote against the [plastic conduit] proposal. 191 
To that end, they recruited 230 persons to join the Association and paid over 
$100,000 in expenses for these recruits. The strategy was successful and, while 
unethical, apparently was not prohibited by the Association's rules.192 Allied 
Tube subsequently brought an antitrust action seeking damages for injuries 
resulting from the exclusion ofplastic conduits by the Code itself, but not for any 
injuries stemming from the adoption of the Code by governmental entities.193 
Beginning with the now accepted proposition that "[c ]oncerted efforts to 
restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials are protected 
from antitrust liability," Justice Brerinan, writing for the Court, stated that the 
"scope of this protection depends, however, on the source, context, and nature 
ofthe anticompetitive restraint at issue.,,194 Because Allied Tube was not seeking 
damages for the governmental adoption of the Code, any injury to competition 
arose from private action as opposed to governmental action. Under those 
circumstances, the Court stated that "the restraint cannot form the basis for 
antitrust liability ifit is 'incidental' to a valid effort to influence governmental 
action. The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr 
immunity, varies with the context and nature ofthe activity." 195 The central issue 
in Allied Tube, therefore, was whether the defendant's conduct represented 
petitioning-a valid effort to influence governmental action. 
For the purposes of its analysis, the Court accepted. the defendant's 
arguments that efforts to influence the Association's standards-setting process 
represented the most effective means of influencing legislation and that any 
effect the Code had in the marketplace of its own force was, in general, incidental 
190. See id. at 495-96. 

J91. Id. at 496. 

192. See id. at 497. 
193 . See id. at 498. 
194. Id at 499. 
195. Id. (construing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 143 (1961». 
413 2000] THE RIGHT TO PETITION 
to a genuine effort to influence governmental action. 196 As such, there was no 
issue that the defendant was not genuinely attempting to influence government. 
Accepting these arguments, however, did not end the inquiry. According to the 
Court: 
We cannot agree with [the] absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine 
immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence 
governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then, for 
example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price 
agreements as long as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate 
level for governmental ratemaking or price supports. . .. Horizontal 
conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other 
economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the 
ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to 
agree to the conspirators' terrns. 197 
The method in which the defendant attempted to influence government, 
therefore, was critical in determining whether petitioning immunity would be 
recognized. 
Given the context and nature ofthe activities, the Court ultimately concluded 
that Noerr immunity did not apply. The Court stated that "[w]hat distinguishes 
this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the context and nature ofpetitioner's 
activity make it the type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its 
validity determined by the antitrust laws themselves.,,198 In other words, the 
private conduct in Allied Tube was not simply petitioning but, instead, 
commercial conduct. First, the context of the conduct in question was the 
standard-setting process of a private association which the courts have 
traditionally examined because oftheir independent potential to restrain trade. 199 
As the Court stated, an "agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly 
an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of 
products," and, therefore, a classic example ofa restraint upon trade.2°O Because 
the conduct occurs in a private forum in which the actors have economic 
incentives to restrain trade, it is a far cry from an open political arena in which 
divergent viewpoints may be heard.201 
Along those same lines, the nature of the activity at issue could not be 
classified as an effort to persuade "an independent decision-maker." Instead, the 
defendant "organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the Association's 
decision-making authority in setting the standard.,,202 The Association's rejection 
of plastic conduits was not accomplished through debate and discussion on the 
196. See id. at 502. 
197. ld. at 503 . 
198. ld. at 505. 
199. See id. at 500, 504. 
200. ld. at 500. 
201. See id. at 506-07. 
202. ld. at 507. 
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merits. Rather, the steel industry packed the Association meeting with paid 
agents whose only role was to vote against plaintiffs proposal. The steel 
companies paid individuals to become members ofthe Association, paid for their 
expenses, instructed them where to sit, and instructed them when to vote.203 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that subjecting this type 
of behavior to antitrust scrutiny in no way diminished the defendant's ability to 
engage in actual petitioning against plastic conduits. According to the Court, 
"[P]etitioner, and others concerned about the safety or competitive threat of 
polyvinyl chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in concerted 
efforts to influence those governments through direct lobbying, publicity 
campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression.,,204 
Additionally, defendant could take advantage of the forum provided by the 
association "by presenting and vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence 
before a nonpartisan private standard-setting body.,,205 While this latter approach 
would not be immune from antitrust scrutiny, it might deflect antitrust liability 
under the rule ofreason.206 
As a result, even though the defendant genuinely intended to influence 
governmental action, was in fact successful in obtaining governmental action, 
and accomplished its objectives without violating any rules of either the 
Association or the legislative arena, the Court concluded that its activities were · 
not insulated from antitrust scrutiny. It did so because the defendant's conduct 
did not represent petitioning. At best it could be characterized "as commercial 
conduct with a political impact.,,207 At worst, it was a purely selfish economic 
decision accomplished through the exercise of raw market power. Either way, 
it was not protected by the right to petition. 
Petitioning immunity also turned on the nature of the private conduct in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n.208 Once 
again, the Court was confronted with the issue ofwhether the conduct in question 
could be considered petitioning. In Superior Court, approximately 100 lawyers 
who regularly represented indigent defendants in the District ofColumbia sought 
an increase in the hourly rates paid under the District of Columbia Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA).209 The CJA lawyers employed a three-fold strategy. First, 
they prepared and signed a petition seeking an increase in the hourly wages; 
second, they agreed to refuse any new CJA assignments until they received their 
raise; and third, they arranged a series of events to publicize their plight. zlD As 
a result of the collective decision to stop taking cases, the District's criminal 
justice system was eventually overwhelmed, prompting the Mayor to agree to an 
203 . See id. at 497. 
204. ld. at510. 
205. M 

20(; See id. at 500-0 I. 

207. Id. at 507. 

208. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 

209. See id. at 415-16. 

210. See id. at 416. 
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increase in CJA rates as demanded.211 
In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against 
the lawyers arguing that they had engaged in unfair methods of competition 
through "a conspiracy to fix prices" and conducting a boycott.212 It should be 
noted at the outset that the FTC did not claim that the formal act of petitioning 
itself or the publicity efforts violated the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court 
stated that "[i]t is, of course, clear that the association's efforts to publicize the 
boycott, to explain the merits of its cause, and to lobby District officials to enact 
favorable legislation ... were activities that were fully protected by the First 
Amendment.,,213 Accordingly, the sole issue before the Court was whether the 
boycott itself was protected by the First Amendment. 
Although the boycott certainly represented an effort to influence government, 
. the Supreme Court concluded that the boycott was not protected petitioning. 
According to the Court, this issue was "largely disposed of' by Allied Tube, in 
which the Court explained that Noerr does not protect every effort genuinely 
intended to influence government. Otherwise, "[h]orizontal conspiracies or 
boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from the 
government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely intended 
to influence the government to agree to the conspirators' terms.,,214 The CJA 
boycott was a horizontal agreement among competitors that was unquestionably 
"a 'naked restraint' on price and outpUt.,,215 As explained by the appellate court, 
the constriction in price created by the boycott is the "essence of 'price-fixing,' 
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the 
quantity demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price 
offered.,,216 
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the boycott was protected 
speech. Although the Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 217 recognized 
some First Amendment protection for boycotts seeking to vindicate constitutional 
rights, it did so "[0]nly after recognizing the well settled validity of prohibitions 
against various economic boycotts . . . .'>218 In general, the regulation of 
economic boycotts only incidentally effects the rights ofspeech and association. 
Accordingly, the government has "power to regulate [such] economic activity," 
especially when a clear objective of the boycott is economic gain for the 
participants.219 In the Court's view, the boycott represented econo~ic rather than 
211. See id. at417-18. 
212. ld. at 418. 
213. Jd. at 426. 
214. Jd. at425 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.lndian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 
(1988)). 
215. ld. at 423 . 
216. Jd. 
217. 458 U.S. 886(1982). 
218. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n , 493 U.S. at 428 (citing Claiborne Hardware, 458 
U.S. at 912). 
219. ld. 
416 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:385 
political activity. 
Another way to interpret Superior Court is to recognize that with the boycott, 
the CJA attorneys had gone beyond merely attempting to persuade an 
independent decision-maker. Instead of limiting their efforts to persuading the 
District through the presentation of facts and arguments or through public 
pressure, the attorneys used the boycott to economically coerce the government 
into action. This distinction is made clear by Justice Brennan's opinion.220 
According to Justice Brennan: 
The Petition and Free Speech Clauses ofthe First Amendment guarantee 
citizens the right to communicate with the government, and when a 
group persuades the government to adopt a particular policy through the 
force of its ideas and the power of its message, no antitrust liability can 
attach. . .. But a group's effort to use market power to coerce the 
government through economic means may subject the participants to 
antitrust liability. 221 
This distinction between persuasion and coercion is clearly consistent with the 
historical origins ofthe right to petition. Historically, petitions were rejected by 
the King and Parliament if their requests for government action were not 
sufficiently deferential.222 Ifa petition could be rejected because its request was 
not sufficiently deferential, demands and coercion would certainly be refused. 
Today, while the acceptance ofpopular sovereignty has changed the relationship 
between the people and government, unless the people are acting in their 
sovereign capacity, public questions are to be resolved by government through 
a representative and deliberative process.223 Coercion, like the right to instruct 
representatives, necessarily undermines the deliberative process.224 Consequently 
both Allied Tube and Superior Court stand for the proposition that while various 
efforts to persuade an independent governmental decision maker are protected 
220. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the boycott was not insulated from 
antitrust scrutiny either as petitioning or speech. His disagreement with the Court was over whether 
the conduct must necessarily lead to antitrust liability. See id. at 437 (Brennan, J. , concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). In his opinion, although the expressive component of an economic 
boycott did not render the boycott absolutely immune, it cautioned in favor of applying the rule of 
reason to determine whether the boycott achieved its objective through political persuasion or 
through market power. See id. at 446. 
221. Id. at 437-38 . 
222. See, e.g., Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 32 ("Early petitions presented by the colonies to 
England were composed with respectful language and began with expressions of the petitioners' 
subservience, loyalty, and support for the crown. Such petitions were the only authorized channel 
through which criticism of the government was funneled."). 
223. See Ku, supra note 104, at 557-76 (discussing when constitutional change can 
legitimately claim to represent an act ofpopular sovereignty); Casso R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences 
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) (arguing that law making must be based on 
reasoned deliberation). 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39. 
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under the right to petition, efforts to dictate the result either directly through 
market power or indirectly through governmental coercion will be subjected to 
scrutiny.22s 
The means analysis employed by the Supreme Court examines whether the 
challenged conduct is in fact petitioning-an effort to persuade an independent 
governmental decision-maker through the presentation of facts and arguments. 
I f the conduct is petitioning, a court must then determ ine whether that petitioning 
is valid according to the rules and procedures of the forum in which the activity 
occurs. This two-step examination ensures that the conduct in question does not 
subvert the political process and governmental accountability. As Professor 
E1hauge has noted, we allow private, financially interested actors to make 
important decisions about resource allocation in the market because free 
competition "causes producers to provide goods at the lowest cost to those who 
value them the most.,,226 Under those circumstances, antitrust review ensures that 
those private "actions conform to this competitive process rather than undermine 
it to reap monopoly profits.,,227 In contrast, we allow government to determine 
the public good even through restraints of trade because, in theory, its decision­
making takes place in a political process with procedures that ensure that 
government remains accountable to the people.228 By determining whether the 
conduct represents persuasion rather than coercion and that the means employed 
are consistent with the rules and norms of the governmental forum, the means 
analysis protects both the individual's right to petition and governmental 
accountability.229 
B. The Source ofthe Antitrust Injury 
In addition to the means employed, Noerr immunity depends upon the source 
225. See also Wigwam Assocs., Inc. v. McBride, 24 Mass. Law. Wkly. S2 (Feb. 5, 1996) 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that the "badmouthing" ofa developer to prospective home buyers 
fell outside the context of petitioning government). 
226. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1197-98. 
227. Id. 
228. See id. 
229. Professor Minda argues that the Noerr doctrine should be reconsidered in light of 
interest group theory because ofthe potential for business interests to capture the political process. 
See Minda, supra note 10, at 1027-28. Instead, he proposes that "courts should adopt a standard 
and an understanding of the first amendment that carefully limits petitioning activity of business 
when such activity is part of a profit-maximizing strategy for monopolizing markets, regardless of 
context." Id. at 911 . The problem with this approach is that it places too much faith in the judicial 
process and undervalues the role that petitioning and other political rights play in protecting against 
the very evil that concerns Professor Minda-unresponsive government. Instead of relying upon 
the political process to eliminate governmental capture, Professor Minda would rely upon judges 
to determine when business has gone too far. However, this approach elevates the policies 
embodied in antitrust laws to the level ofconstitutional law and overlooks the potential for judicial 
capture. 
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" 
ofthe harm to competition. As the Supreme Court has noted, there is a "dividing 
line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting 
from private action ...."230 Presumably, private actors can not be held 
responsible for the former, while they are responsible for the latter. However, 
this distinction between public versus private action unnecessarily clouds the 
immunity analysis and provides an incomplete picture of petitioning immunity. 
Arguably, any time petitioning conduct is challenged as a violation of law the 
costs imposed upon competitors or other injuries to competition can be said to 
originate from private conduct or the original petitioning activity. Independent 
ofthe source of the ultimate restraint, the act of petitioning itself, whether it be 
the filing of a formal petition, a lawsuit, informal lobbying, or a publicity 
campaign, imposes costs on competition simply by requiring competitors to 
respond.23I Yet, immunity for these types of "injuries" is required even though 
they cannot be attributed to government.232 Moreover, petitioning immunity 
insulates private actors even when their petitioning efforts fail, and any resulting 
restraint upon competition clearly cannot be attributed to government.233 
Although the public/private distinction provides justification for immunity under 
certain limited circumstances, it hardly explains when and why protection should 
be granted in the vast majority of cases. Consequently, the question should not 
be whether the restraint can be attributed to public versus private decision­
making. Instead, the source prong should focus on determining whether the 
restraint results from valid petitioning. 
Unfortunately, the source ofthis doctrinal confusion stems from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Noerr itself. In justifying immunity, the Court stated that 
"where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid 
governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be 
made OUt.,,234 This conclusion was required because "under our form of 
government the question whether a law of that kind should pass, or if passed be 
enforced, is the responsibility of the appropriate legislative or executive branch 
of government so long as the law itself does not violate some provision of the 
230. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. , 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988). 
231. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, ,Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 143­
44 (1961). 
232. See id. 
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation. . that an 
incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some direct injury upon the 
interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed.... To hold that the 
knowing infliction of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be 
tantamount to outlawing alJ such campaigns. 
ld. 
233 . See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 201, at 16 ("Even if the proposed action 
is rejected and a rival has been burdened by being forced to oppose the measure or defend himself 
in a lawsuit, such a burden is the normal result of governmental processes and its imposition on a 
rival is not wrongful."). 
234. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 136. 
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Constitution.,,235 In support, the Court relied upon its decision in Parker v. 
Brown/36 in which it recognized state action immunity, or in other words, thatthe 
Sherman Act does not apply to state programs that impose unreasonable 
restraints upon trade. This reflects the understanding that a governmental 
decision to act "reflects an independent governmental choice, constituting a 
supervening 'cause' that breaks the link between a private party's request and the 
plaintiff's injury.,,237 Along these lines, the Court characterized Noerr as merely 
a "corollary to Parker" required because it would be "peculiar in a democracy, 
and perhaps in derogation ofthe constitutional right 'to petition the Government 
for a redress ofgrievances,' ... to establish a category of lawful state action that 
citizens are not permitted to urge.,,238 
Petitioning immunity is more than a mere corollary to state action immunity. 
As mentioned earlier in Noerr, the Court was not asked to consider whether the 
railroads could be held responsible for damages resulting from the Governor's 
legislation of a bill favorable to the trucking industry, but instead whether the 
railroads could be held responsible for injuring the truckers' relationships with 
their customers through their publicity campaign and costs incurred by the 
truckers in responding to that campaign with a publicity effort of their own.239 
In other words, the truckers were seeking damages resulting directly from the act 
of petitioning rather than indirectly through governmental action.240 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the petitioners were immune from 
liability for those direct injuries because they inevitably result from any effort to 
petition government, and "[t]o hold that the knowing infliction of such injury 
renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to outlawing all 
such campaigns.,,241 In other words, the fact that customers may be lost because 
ofa lawsuit or negative public relations campaign and that defendants will incur 
expenses in defending against a lawsuit or hiring lobbyists of their own, are 
inevitably associated with any effort to solicit government action. Holding a 
petitioner responsible for such costs simply because they are not caused by 
government would eviscerate the right to petition. Accordingly, in order to 
protect the act ofpetitioning itself, the Court concluded that petitioners could not 
be punished for any injuries resulting directly from protected petitioning 
activities. Because the Court concluded earlier that the conduct ofthe railroads 
satisfied the means prong as valid petitioning activity, it rejected the truckers' 
claims. 
A similar analysis was followed in both Allied Tube and Superior Court, 
even though in both cases the defendants were successful in obtaining 
governmental action in their behalf. In determining whether the defendant could 
235. /d. 
236. 317 U.S . 341 (1943). 
237. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 201, at 14. 
238. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991). 
239. See Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 133-34. 
240. See id. at 143. 
241. /d. at 143-44. 
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be held responsible for damages resulting from the exclusion ofplastic conduits 
from the 1981 Code, the Court emphasized that "where, independent of any 
government action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private 
action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is 'incidental' 
to a valid effort to influence governmental action.,,242 Because the Court 
concluded that Indian Head's manipulation of the private standard setting 
association was not a valid petitioning effort, the Court held that its conduct was 
not immunized, and the defendant was held responsible for $3 .8 million in lost 
profits suffered by the plaintiff.243 
Similarly, because the economic boycott in Superior Court was found to be 
an invalid means of petitioning, the CJA lawyers could be subjected to antitrust 
liability for the restraint upon trade resulting from their boycott. In particular, the 
Court noted that the restraint was not the "intended consequence of public 
action," but was "the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable 
legislation," and that "the emergency legislative response to the boycott put an 
end to the restraint. ,,244 Once again, because the defendants' conduct was not 
considered a valid means ofpetitioning, they were held responsible for the injury 
to competition directly resulting from that conduct. The critical question in the 
source prong, therefore, is whether the injury results from a valid effort to 
influence government, not whether the government or a private actor is the 
source ofthe harm, or whether the harm is characterized as direct or incidental. 
When the alleged injury results not only from valid petitioning activities but 
from government's response to that petition, the argument for immunity is even 
stronger. Not only is the right to petition implicated, but the causal chain is 
broken by the decision of an independent, financially disinterested, public 
decision-maker.24S As the Supreme Court recognized, it is "beyond the purpose 
of the antitrust laws to identify and invalidate lawmaking" because it may have 
been infected by selfish motives.246 While this certainly adds an additional arrow 
to the defendant's quiver ofimmunity arguments, the pivotal question is whether 
the challenged conduct is considered valid petitioning. If the conduct is 
considered valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from all liability, 
regardless of whether the injuries are caused by the defendant directly through 
the act of petitioning itself or indirectly by governmental adoption of the 
petitioner's position.247 In contrast, if the activity does not represent valid 
242. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988). 
243. See id. at 498. 
244. Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S . 411 , 425 
(1990). 
245. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 201, at 14. 
246. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991). 
247. Some commentators have argued that given the importance of competitive economic 
policy in this country, Noerr immunity should be narrowly tailored, especially given the possibility 
for imposing considerable costs upon competitors directly through petitioning. See, e.g., Hurwitz, 
supra note 7; Meyer, supra note 7. At least one commentator has argued that Noerr immunity 
should not be granted if the defendant's conduct is in effect not the least restrictive means for 
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petitioning, defendants are subject to antitrust scrutiny even ifthey are ultimately 
successful in obtaining governmental action. As such, the means/source test can 
be collapsed into a single inquiry: Is the private conduct a valid effort to 
influence government?248 
III. THE METHODOLOGY ApPLIED TO SETILEMENTS 
Having proposed a methodology for determining whether immunity is 
justified under the right to petition, the next step is to apply the analysis to the 
settlement of litigation. Because settlements vary in "source, context, and 
nature," this section examines whether the right to petition immunizes purely 
private settlement agreements-those entered into between private litigants in 
which no court approval is sought or required.249 An analysis of private 
. settlements under the means/source test clearly leads to the conclusion that such 
agreements are not protected by the right to petition. 
When private parties enter into settlement agreements, the right to petition 
is not implicated. For the purposes of this discussion, private settlements are 
settlements arrived at between parties to the litigation in which dismissal of the 
action is accomplished by stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1) ofthe Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.25o Under those circumstances, judicial approval of the 
achieving governmental action and the action sought is illegitimate. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 
832. These arguments diminish the importance of the right to petition while elevating the values 
of free-market economics. The right to petition is guaranteed in our Constitution to ensure that 
government remains responsive to the people. If the people want to eliminate the Shennan Act, 
impose a command economy, or even eliminate government altogether, it is their prerogative to do 
so. Similarly, while it may make sense as a matter of economic policy to require defendants to 
choose the least costly means ofpetitioning government, such a requirement would impennissibly 
chill the right to petition by subjecting petitioners to SLAPP suits in which the government or 
private parties are allowed to second guess the means by which political or private change is sought. 
248. By focusing on whether challenged conduct is valid petitioning without reference to 
antitrust laws or principles, the means/source test is equally useful for identifying conduct that falls 
under the protection ofthe right to petition when that conduct is alleged to have violated other laws. 
249. Court approved settlement agreements or consent decrees in the context of: )) voluntary 
dismissals under Rule 4) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure; 2) class action settlements under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 3) government prosecutions under the 
Antitrust Procedures and Penalty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16, are the subject of Part IV. 
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) provides: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23( e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United 
States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing 
a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of 
a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of 
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated 
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that 
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an 
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settlement agreement is neither required nor permitted.25t While the antitrust 
laws do not preclude parties from entering into settlement agreements, that does 
not mean that those parties are necessarily absolved from any anticompetitive 
harm resulting from those agreements. Applying the means/source test to 
settlements demonstrates that such conduct should not be immune from antitrust 
scrutiny. 
The first step in the means/source analysis is to determine whether the 
conduct in question can be considered petitioning.2S2 Private settlements fail to 
satisfy this first prong because they are in fact the antithesis of efforts to solicit 
government action. While lobbying legislatures or public officials, conducting 
pUblicity campaigns, and filing lawsuits are all attempts to persuade an 
independent government decision-maker to adopt one's view, no similar claim 
can be made when private parties enter into a settlement agreement. When 
private parties enter into a settlement agreement, they are affirmatively 
withdrawing consideration of the matter from the decisionmaking authority of 
government. Under those circumstances, the parties are no longer attempting to 
persuade government to adopt a potentially anticompetitive policy, nor are they 
soliciting government action. Instead, they have officially given up any such 
effort and are acting on their own. As the nature of the conduct does not 
represent petitioning, there is no need to determine whether that petitioning . 
activity was in accordance with the rules ofthe judicial forum. Consequently, 
private settlement agreements clearly fail the means prong ofthe Noerr analysis. 
Even though failure of the means prong is sufficient to deny immunity, 
private settlement agreements also fail the source prong ofthe Noerr analysis.253 
When private parties enter into a settlement agreement without judicial 
participation, any anticompetitive effects arising from the agreement can in no 
way be fairly attributed to valid petitioning activity. As the Supreme Court has 
recognized in another context, a settlement agreement is simply a contract, for 
which part ofthe consideration is the dismissal ofa lawsuit.254 Given the private 
nature of these agreements, we can legitimately question whether the public's 
interests are being considered, let alone vindicated, by these private attorneys 
general.25S As recognized by Professor Fiss, "[T]he bargain is at best contractual 
and does not contain the kind of enforcement commitment already embodied in 
action based on or including the same claim. 
Id. 
251. See 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: 
CIVIL § 2363, at 270-72 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. 
252. See supra Part II.A. 
253. As discussed earlier, the means/source test can actually be collapsed into a single 
inquiry: does the private conduct represent valid petitioning. This, however, does not make the 
source prong irrelevant. There may be circumstances in which the conduct in question represents 
valid petitioning, but is not the source of the antitrust injury. The source prong, therefore, is 
necessary to protect competitors from injurious conduct not protected under the First Amendment. 
254. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). 
255. See generally Fiss, supra note 126. 
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a decree that is the product of a trial and the judgment of a court. ,,256 
Consequently, any resulting harm to competition finds its source in that contract 
and the market power wielded by the signatories.257 Under those circumstances, 
government action is not solicited, nor will it be unless a court is subsequently 
asked to enforce the terms ofthat contract in the event ofa disagreement between 
the parties.2S8 
Consequently, the central justifications for Noerr immunity are absent in the 
context of settlement agreements. This conclusion should be the same even if a 
court would have ordered the same remedy. "The fact that Congress through 
utilization of the precise methods here employed could seek to reach the same 
objectives sought by respondents does not mean that respondents or any other 
group may do so without specific Congressional authority.,,259 Immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny or any other laws for that matter is not based upon whether the 
outcomes are acceptable or permissible, but depends upon the means used to 
achieve those outcomes?60 By withdrawing the matter from government 
consideration, parties to a private settlement agreement have steered a course 
outside the protection of the right to petition. 
The conclusion that private settlement agreements are not insulated from 
antitrust scrutiny is consistent with existing case law. The only court decision 
on point is In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation261 that involved 
five antitrust lawsuits against various producers and suppliers ofnatural gas. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had engaged in price fixing in violation of 
the Sherman ACt.262 The price fixing was allegedly the result of the settlement 
ofclaims in a separate litigation brought by the producers ofnatural gas against 
the supplier.263 The separate litigation involved, among other things, the 
interpretation of"favored nations (or price equalization) clauses" in the contracts 
between the producers and the supplier.264 The defendants in the subsequent 
action claimed that the initiation, prosecution, and settlement of the earlier 
lawsuits were exempt from antitrust liability under the Noerr doctrine.265 
The court disagreed and held that "a private settlement accomplished without 
Court participation should not be afforded Noerr-Pennington protection.,,266 
256. ld. at 1085. 
257. Additionally, disparities in power between the parties may also lead us to question 
whether the terms of the agreement are even just between them. See id. at 1075-82 (noting that the 
sett lement process may be infected by coercion, unequal bargaining power, and the absence of 
authoritative consent). 
258. See id. 
259. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co ., 310 U.S. 150, 225-26 (1940). 
260. See supra Part II.A. 
261. No. 403, 1982 WL 1827 (D.N.M., Jan. 26, 1982). 
262. See id. at *4. 
263 . See id. 
264 . Id. at *4 n.8. 
265. See id. at *5. 
266. ld. at • 6. 
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According to the court: 
When parties petition a Court for judicial action [Noerr] protection 
attaches, but when they voluntarily withdraw their dispute from the court 
and resolve it by agreement among themselves there would be no 
purpose served by affording Noerr-Pennington protection. The parties 
by so doing must abide with any antitrust consequences that result from 
their settlement. The defendants have pointed to no case which would 
afford Noerr-Pennington protection to private settlement of litigation, 
and logic would indicate no reason why there should be such 
protection.267 
The court opined, however, that the result may be different when "the settlement 
was submitted to the Court and approved in an order ofdismissal ofthe case.,,268 
The defendants argued that because the settlement had been submitted and 
incorporated as part ofthe order ofdismissal the settlement is immunized, while 
the plaintiffs argued that the sham exception would apply. 269 The court declined 
to reach the issue at that stage of the litigation.270 The district court's decision 
in In re New Mexico Gas, therefore, clearly supports the conclusion that private 
settlements are not immune merely because the parties to the agreement have 
"voluntarily" withdrawn their request for governmental decision-making and · 
acted on their own. 
The FTC has also concluded that private settlement agreements are not 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny. In In re YKK, Inc.,271 the FTC concluded that the 
terms of a settlement offer constituted unfair competition. The case involved 
competitors, YKK Incorporated and Talon Incorporated, who manufactured and 
sold zippers.272 An attorney for YKK sent a letter accusing Talon of"unfair and 
predatory sales tactics" by offering free equipment to customers.273 Apparently, 
YKK offered to drop the matter if both agreed to stop providing free 
equipment.274 The Commission concluded that "[a]n agreement between Talon 
and YKK to cease this form of discounting would have constituted an 
unreasonable restraint of competition.,,275 The concurring opinion of 
Commissioner Deborah K. Owen notes that any agreement between YKK and 
Talon would have represented the settling of "allegations of unlawful price 
discrimination.,,276 The fact that the agreement would have represented such a 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at *7. 
269. See infra Part IV for a discussion whether court approval of settlements justifies 
immunity. 
270. See In re New Mexico Natural Gas Litig., 1982 WL 1827, at ·7. 
271. F.T .C. 628 (1993). 
272. See id. at 629. 
273. See id. 
274. See id. at 641 (concurring statement of Comm'r Starek). 
275 . Id. at 629. 
276. Id. at 641. 
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settlement did not, however, prevent the FTC from scrutinizing its 
anticompetitive nature. 
The context of private settlement, however, does not remove from 
antitrust scrutiny inherently suspect conduct that lacks an efficiency 
justification. In civil cases generally, a legitimate intent or purpose 
would not justify a restraint that has unreasonably anticompetitive 
effects. Moreover, even a good faith attempt to avoid Robinson-Patman 
liability will not excuse anticompetitive conduct that is clearly 
inconsistent with the broader purposes of the U.S. antitrust laws.277 
Commissioner Starek also noted that even ifYKK's invitation was a good faith 
offer of settlement, the terms of that settlement exceeded the scope ofwhat was 
"reasonably necessary to achieve a settlement. The potential effects of such an 
invitation are unambiguously anticompetitive.'027s 
Assuming arguendo that YKK's threats of litigation were made in good 
faith, the appropriate quid pro quo for the competitor's commitment to 
cease from engaging in the putative violation was YKK's commitment 
to forgo initiating litigation. YKK, however, went further, offering to 
discontinue an important form of discounting in exchange for the 
competitor's commitment to discontinue such discounting. This conduct 
poses a substantial threat to competition, particularly in cases such as 
this where the evidence strongly suggests that the relevant firms, acting 
in concert, have market power.279 
Commissioner Starek concluded by stating that "competitors attempting to 
resolve claims ofunlawful discounting under the Robinson-Patman Act [should] 
understand that any settlement or attempted settlement must pass scrutiny under 
U.S. antitrust laws forbidding unreasonable restraints of trade . .. .',2S0 
Commissioner Dennis A. Yao, in his concurring statement, also stressed that 
YKK went beyond requesting that Talon cease any allegedly unlawful 
practices.281 He stressed that: 
Although the Commission must take care in cases like this to avoid any 
misimpression that mere settlement discussions could lead to a Section 
5 action, the Commission cannot abdicate its responsibility to challenge 
an unlawful invitation to collude solely because it occurs during an 
otherwise lawful conversation.282 
Both concurrences make clear that even good faith efforts at settling disputes and 
277. Id. at 642 (footnote omitted). 
278. Id. at 643. 
279. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
280. Id. at 643-44. 
281. See id. at 645 (concurring statement ofComm'r Yao)("Most importantly, the lawyer's 
actions here went beyond requesting that his client's competitor cease an allegedly unlawful 
practice ...."). 
282. ld. at 646. 
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the agreements that arise from those efforts are subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
They also esta.blish a rule, or at least a presumption, that settlement agreements 
represent unreasonable restraints if they require more than the cessation of the 
allegedly unlawful practice in exchange for not bringing or dismissing a lawsuit. 
The only appellate court decision to touch upon this question is the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real 
Estate Investors, Inc. 283 In that case, the defendant in a private antitrust suit 
argued that the plaintiff's refusal to settle the litigation violated the antitrust 
laws.284 In rejecting this argument, the court stated that, "[aJ decision to accept 
or reject an offer ofsettlement is conduct incidental to the prosecution ofthe suit 
and not a separate and distinct activity which might form the basis for antitrust 
liability.,,28s Because the Supreme Court held that beginning a lawsuit cannot be 
the basis for antitrust liability, the Ninth Circuit's holding that refusing to settle 
an ongoing lawsuit cannot form the basis for antitrust liability is not only 
consistent with that rule, but required. The rejection of a settlement offer 
represents nothing less than a decision to continue the petitioning effort. It 
would be strange indeed if the First Amendment protected the right to begin 
petitioning but not the right to continue to engage in petitioning conduct. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the court's dicta that a decision to 
accept a settlement is likewise insulated. 
While the symmetry of "accept or reject" is facially appealing, it is not 
consistent with the overall thrust ofNoerr immunity which, as discussed above, 
only applies: (1) to legitimate efforts to persuade the government as an 
independent decision-maker, and (2) when the alleged antitrust injury results 
from valid petitioning activity.286 With the exception ofthe unsupported dicta in 
Professional Real Estate Investors, the conclusion that private settlement 
agreements are not immunized by the right to petition is consistent not only with 
Supreme Court interpretation but also with the only decision to actually address 
the issue. 
IV. THE METHODOLOGY ApPLIED TO CONSENT DECREES 
The main wrinkle in the argument that the settlement agreements are subject 
to antitrust scrutiny and not exempt under the First Amendment arises when the 
agreements are approved by a court and entered as consent decrees. As one court 
recognized, there is an argument that agreements approved by a court should 
have a different status under Noerr than purely private agreements. 287 
Judicial approval of settlements is required in several different contexts. 
First, under Rule 41 ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, judicial approval is 
283. 944 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991), afJ'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 49 (1992). 
284. See id. at 1528. 
285 . ld. 
286 . See supra Part lILA-B. 
287. See In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 403, 1982 WL 1827, at *7 
(D.N.M., Jan. 26, 1982). 
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required when dismissal is sought unilaterally.288 Second, in class actions, a 
court must determine whether the entry of a judgment is in the public interest 
under Rule 23( e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.289 Lastly, under the 
Antitrust Procedure and Penalty Act, a court is authorized to enter a final 
judgment and consent decree only after the receipt of comments on the 
competitive impact ofthe proposed settlement and ajudicial determination that 
the consent decree is in the public interest.290 Assuming that the parties would 
not abide by the terms of the settlement absent judicial approval and 
incorporation into a court order, it would be difficult to separate the source ofthe 
antitrust harm from government as opposed to private action. Court approval, 
however, still does not bring settlement agreements within the scope ofthe Noerr 
doctrine because, as the following discussion demonstrates, the First Amendment 
justifications are still absent. First, the conduct in question still does not 
represent an attempt to solicit government action. Second, even if seeking 
judicial approval of a private agreement could be considered petitioning, doing 
so to insulate anticompetitive conduct would not be considered valid petitioning. 
A. Non-petitioning Means 
Agreements approved by a court and incorporated into ajudicial order should 
not be immunized for the same reasons that private settlements were not immune 
under the right to petition-the means associated with and culminating in the 
settlement do not represent petitioning. Whereas private settlement agreements 
clearly represent private contracts, consent decrees represent a hybrid between 
contract and judicial decree.291 Despite the judicial involvement, the means 
employed in reaching the agreement are still the same as those used to enter into 
private settlement or any private commercial contract. Accordingly, the means 
used still do not represent an effort to solicit government action by presenting the 
merits of their claims for a judge to decide. The parties to the settlement are 
affirmatively withdrawing the merits ofthe decision from the judge and jury, and 
resolving the dispute among themselves to acquire "a bargained for arrangement 
288. See FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a) & (b). 
289. See id. Rule 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the 
approval of the court . . .."). 
290. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1994). 
291. See Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. ofEduc., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The 
consent decree is . .. ' a voluntary settlement agreement which could be fully effective without 
judicial intervention' and ' a final judicial order ... plac[ing] the power and prestige of the court 
behind the compromise struck by the parties. '" (quoting Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 
(6th Cir. \983))); Jed Goldfarb, Keeping Rufo in Its Cell: The Modification ofAntitrust Consent 
Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625, 630 (1997) ("The 
prevailing modern view is that a consent decree is a hybrid, possessing attributes of both a contract 
and ajudicial decree."); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights ofThird Parties, 87 MICH . 
L. REv. 321, 324 (\988) (noting the dominance of the hybrid view). 
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[which] more closely resembles a contract than an injunction.,,292 In so doing, the 
parties can be treated as orchestrating the decision-making process by privately 
negotiating the terms of the settlement and then presenting them to the court as 
a/ait accompli which any court would be hard-pressed to reject.293 Settlement 
resolves the ongoing dispute before a court by depriving the "court of the 
occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation" ofthe law and 
the facts.294 Given that "[p]arties might settle while leaving justice undone,,,295 
the context and nature of judicially approved consent decrees is closer to the 
quintessential private economic agreement unprotected by the First Amendment 
and subject to antitrust scrutiny than a judicial decree following a trial on the 
merits. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by both Allied Tube and Superior Court, 
subsequent governmental approval does not immunize otherwise non-petitioning 
conduct.296 Under these circumstances, court-approved settlements could be 
analogized to the conduct found wanting in Allied Tube where the producer of 
steel conduits orchestrated the decision-making process of the private 
association. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court concluded that immunity 
was not justified even though the defendant actually sought government approval 
of the Code as adopted by the association, influencing the association was the 
most effective means of influencing government, and the defendant was 
successful in obtaining governmental approval in numerous instances.297 
Similarly, in Superior Court, the Court found thatthe CJ A attorneys' boycott was 
not petitioning because it was a quintessential horizontal restraint oftrade and an 
attempt to coerce governmental action rather than an effort to persuade on the 
merits.298 Even though parties to a lawsuit may genuinely seek governmental 
approval of the terms of their settlement and successfully obtain approval, the 
non-petitioning nature of their conduct should be sufficient to subject them to 
antitrust scrutiny.299 
292. Fiss, supra note 126, at 1084. 
293 . See id. at 1085 ("A court cannot proceed (or not proceed very far) in the face of a 
settlement. "). 
294. [d. 
295. [d. 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 188-225. 
297. See supra text accompanying notes 188-207. 
298. Although both cases may be distinguished because they dealt with conduct that 
independently imposed restraints of trade regardless of whether or not government acted and a 
proposed settlement would have no adverse impact on competition until it is approved by a court, 
the reasoning in both decisions is still applicable. 
299. This does not mean that the parties' actual presentation to the court for judicial approval 
cannot be considered protected petitioning, but rather that the prior acts of negotiating the 
settlement and ultimately the settlement itself would not be considered protected petitioning. 
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B. Invalid Means 
Even assuming that asking a court to approve a settlement could nonetheless 
be considered petitioning and that the petitioning would include the act of 
negotiating and entering into the settlement itself, it is by no means clear that the 
petitioning would be considered valid ifthe parties are seekingjudicial approval 
of the anticompetitive consequences of the settlement. First, as the following 
. discussion demonstrates, judicial approval of settlement agreements does not 
usually represent judicial approval of the anticompetitive effects of the 
agreement. Second, in general, courts do not have the authority to immunize 
anticompetitive conduct. Under those circumstances, private parties know or 
should know that judicial approval does not mean approval ofthe anti competitive 
consequences of their agreement, and their effort to claim authorization is 
therefore fraudulent. Furthermore, if the court specifically "approves" any 
resulting restraint upon trade, such approval is beyond the court's authority. In 
either case, the petitioning activity would be considered invalid. 
1. Approval of What?- To begin with, it is not necessary to assume that 
judicial "approval" ofa settlement agreement represents government sanctioning 
of anticompetitive harm for the purposes of Noerr immunity. As the Supreme 
Court consistently reminds us, "Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly 
implied.,,3°O Determining whether a court can be said to have approved any 
restraint upon competition embodied in a settlement would be a necessary 
predicate to determining whether the agreement can be immunized as an effort 
to solicit valid governmental action. 
In general, when asked to approve a settlement agreement, a court is not 
being asked to determine liability or approve the substance of the agreement. In 
fact, most agreements expressly deny any admission ofliability. Consequently, 
the court is not being asked to enforce the law.3ot Nor is the court specifically 
being asked to approve the anticompetitive effects of the agreement. When the 
dismissal is accomplished by stipulation pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), judicial 
approval is not required, and courts cannot impose additional conditions.302 
Unless the parties mutually agree to court approval, a district court is not even 
permitted to enter that the agreement "So Ordered.,,303 Likewise, while Rule 
41(a)(2) does require judicial approval when a party unilaterally moves for 
dismissal, approval under those circumstances merely represents a judicial 
determination that the non-moving party will not be prejudiced by the 
dismissal.304 Approval under Rule 41 is, therefore, at best limited to the 
conclusion that the agreement is fair with respect to the parties entering into the 
300. California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962). 
301. See Eastern RR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S . 127, 138 
(196)) ("[T]he Sherman Act does not apply to the ... mere solicitation ofgovernmental action with 
respect to the . .. enforcement of laws. "). 
302. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 251, at 270-72. 
303. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins, Co., 747 F.2d ) 180 (8th Cir~ 1984). 
304. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 251, at 278-79. 
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agreement. Consequently, the scope of judicial approval of settlement 
agreements under Rule 41 is exceptionally narrow, and the court is under no 
obligation, and arguably has no authority, to evaluate the anticompetitive effects 
of settlements. 
While the judicial role in class actions is noticeably greater, its scope of 
review is likewise insufficient to justifY antitrust immunity. Under Rule 23(e), 
a district court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights ofabsent class members and 
the public in general.305 It cannot accept a settlement agreement that the 
proponents have not demonstrated to be "fair, reasonable, and adequate.,,306 
However, "neither the trial court in approving the settlement nor this Court in 
reviewing that approval have the right or the duty to reach any ultimate 
conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the 
dispute.,,307 A court, therefore, does not have the power or the authority to 
review the underlying facts and law to determine whether a settlement violates 
the antitrust laws. "[U]nless, the terms of the agreement are per se violations of 
antitrust law," the court may only apply a reasonableness standard ofreview.308 
As such, even in the context of Rule 23, judicial approval is quite limited. 
In contrast to both Rule 41 and Rule 23, section 16 ofthe Antitrust Procedure 
and Penalty Act establishes detailed procedures for judicial review of 
anticompetitive harms resulting from consent decrees and specifically requires 
court's to determine whether such agreements are in the public interest.309 For 
example, the statute provides for publication ofthe terms ofthe proposed consent 
decree, pUblication ofa competitive impact statement, written comments by the 
United States, publication ofthe procedures for modifYing the proposed consent 
decree, and a requirement that the court determine that the entry of the consent 
decree is in the public interest considering the competitive impact of the 
judgment.3IO In making the public interest determination, the court is not limited 
to the parties before it, but may rely upon expert witnesses, appoint a special 
master, and authorize the participation of"interested persons. ,,311 Unlike consent 
decrees entered under Rules 41 and 23, with section 16 agreements it would be 
possible to argue that court approval included approval of the anticompetitive 
consequences of the agreement. Not only is the court allowed to consider any 
restraint upon competition, it has a duty to make that inquiry, and cannot enter 
judgment unless it concludes that the agreement is in the public interest. 
Petitioning immunity, however, would not apply with respect to consent 
decrees entered under section 16 for a very simple but very different reason. 
305. See FED. R. elv. P. 23(e). 
306. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 864 (1975). 
307. ld. at 123 (citations omitted). 
308. ld. at 124. 
309. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). 
310. See id. § 16(b )-(t). 
311. ld. § 16(e)-(t). 
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Section 16 only applies in cases brought by or on behalf of the United States.312 
In other words, section 16 is limited to civil and criminal prosecutions. The 
defendants in such cases, therefore, are not exercising their right to petition, but 
are instead defending themselves from government prosecution. As 
demonstrated by the history of the right to petition, petitioning immunity exists 
to protect affirmative efforts to invoke governmental power. The right to petition 
government for redress is, therefore, not implicated under section 16 agreements. 
If immunity is to be granted under these circumstances it would be under the 
"state action" doctrine rather than petitioning. 
Given the limited nature and authority ofcourt "approval" under Rule 41 and 
Rule 23 , it would be difficult to argue that judicial approval of a settlement 
represents approval of any potential restraint upon trade embodied in the 
. settlement. 
2. The Limits ofJudicial Approval.-Moreover, in addition to questioning 
whether a court has in fact "approved" a restraint upon competition embodied in 
a consent decree, it is questionable whether a court has the power to give such 
approval. As a general matter, courts cannot enforce illegal agreements, and the 
Supreme Court has consistently held agreements that violate the antitrust laws 
unenforceable.313 Consequently, petitioning immunity could be denied on the 
basis that asking a court to approve a settlement that restrained trade is an invalid 
form of petitioning under the rules governing the judicial system. 
While there is some disagreement among the Justices as to the 
appropriateness of illegality as a defense to contract law,3J4 there is universal 
agreement that courts cannot lend their authority to acts which would make "the 
courts a party to the carrying out of one of the very restraints forbidden by the 
Sherman Act."m The disagreements among the Justices and the exceptions to 
this rule involve cases in which the defense is raised by a defendant who has 
benefitted from a plaintiffs performance under the challenged contract seeking 
to enjoy the benefits of that performance without the corresponding obligation 
to perform its part ofthe bargain.316 In those cases, the disagreement among the 
Justices is not whether the courts may enforce agreements in violation of the 
312. See id § 16(b). 
313 . See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 79-80 (1982) (holding that a 
collective bargaining agreement which restrained trade could not be enforced); Kelly v. Kosuga, 
358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959) (recognizing that a contract cannot be enforced if"the judgement of the 
Court would itself be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful" by the antitrust laws.); 
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight& Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 261-62() 909) (holding that 
a contract for the sale and purchase of wallpaper which was an integral part of a scheme to 
monopolize the wallpaper industry could not be enforced). 
314. See Kosuga, 358 U.S. at 518 ("As a defense to an action based on contract, the plea of 
illegality based on violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor in this Court.") 
(footnote omitted). 
315. [d. at 520 (citation omitted). 
316. See id at 518. 
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Sherman Act, but whether the particular promise is such an agreement.317 
For example, in Kelly v. Kosuga, the plaintiff and defendant were both 
engaged in the business ofmarketing onions.318 Defendant admittedly purchased 
fifty cars ofonions from the plaintiff, but refused to pay. Instead, the defendant 
argued that the sale was made pursuant to a general agreement between himself, 
the plaintiff, and other marketers ofonions not to deliver plaintiff's onions to the 
futures market for the remainder ofthe season.319 According to the defendant 
such an agreement pertained to the prices of onions and limited the quantity of 
onions sold in Illinois.320 The Supreme Court rejected the defense noting "the 
narrow scope in which the defense is allowed in respect to the Sherman 
Act ...."321 Interpreting its prior precedents, the Court noted that the defense 
has been upheld only when "the judgment ofthe Court would itself be enforcing 
the precise conduct made unlawful by the Act."m Because the sale of onions 
could be separated from the agreement not to restrict the supply of onions 
available on the market, the defense did not apply.323 
Even recognizing the narrow scope of the illegality rule, efforts to seek 
judicial approval and enforcement of settlements agreements which themselves 
embody the prohibited restraint upon trade clearly violate the rule. In that 
respect, the situation is closer to the facts ofContinental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis 
Voight & Sons Co. 324 In that case, the plaintiff sought the enforcement of a . 
contract for the sale and purchase ofwallpaper which it admitted "was intended 
by the parties to be based upon agreements that were and are essential parts of 
an illegal scheme [to restrain trade ]."325 The plaintiff corporation was created by 
nearly all of the wallpaper manufacturers at the time and sold the wallpaper to 
"jobbers.,,326 The plaintiff and the jobbers entered into an agreement in which 
the jobbers would purchase all their wallpaper from the plaintiff. The jobbers 
further agreed that they would not sell the wallpaper at terms better or prices 
lower than those offered by the plaintiff.327 Jobbers who were not part of this 
317. See, e.g., id. at 521 (allowing the enforcement of a contract for the sale of onions at a 
fair price because the sales agreement was separate from another agreement between the parties not 
to deliver onions to the futures market); Continental Wall Paper, 212 U.S. ,at 267-68 (Holmes, 1., 
dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he actual contracts by which the plaintiff bound itself to deliver, and 
the sales under which it did deliver, the specific goods for which it seeks to recover the price," were 
a separate transaction from the general agreement restraining trade), 
318, SeeKosuga,358U,S.at517 , 

319, See id. 

320, See id. 

321. Id. at 520, 
322. M (citation omitted). 

323 , See id. at 521. 

324. 212 U.S, 227 (1909), 
325. M at 261. 
326. Id. at 267-68. 
327. See id. 
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combination were driven out ofbusiness.328 According to the Court, the plaintiff 
sought "a judgment that will give effect ... to agreements that constituted the 
combination, and by means of which the combination proposes to accomplish 
forbidden ends.,,329 This, the Court could not do. "[S]uch ajudgment cannot be 
granted without departing from the statutory rule, long established in the 
jurisprudence ofboth this country and England, that a court will not lend its aid, 
in any way, to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an agreement that appears 
to be tainted with illegality ... .'>330 
This conclusion is consistent with the principle that public "officials have no 
independent authority to exempt conduct from the antitrust laws.,,331 As the 
Supreme Court held: 
[T]hough employees of the government may have known of those 
[restraints of trade] and winked at them or tacitly approved them, no 
immunity would have thereby been obtained. For Congress had 
specified the precise manner and method of securing immunity. None 
other would suffice. Otherwise national policy on such grave and 
important issues as this would be determined not by Congress nor by 
those to whom Congress had delegated authority but by virtual 
volunteers.332 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that before state or federal 
officials can be considered to have granted immunity from antitrust liability to 
private actors, their authority to do so must be clearly and expressly articulated 
either as a matter of state law333 or federal statute.334 
328. See id. 
329. Id. at 262. 
330. Id 
331. ALD, supra note 6, at 964. 
332. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,226-27 (1940). 
333. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988)("The challenged restraint must be 
'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy. '" (quoting California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980»). These decisions 
involved whether private conduct can be considered immunized under the state action doctrine 
which, as articulated by Midcal, not only requires that the anticompetitive policy be clearly 
articulated by the state, the conduct must be "actively supervised by the state itself." Midcal,445 
U.S. at 105. Interestingly, under this analogous doctrine, the Supreme Court has questioned 
whether "state courts, acting in their judicial capacity, can adequately supervise private conduct for 
purposes of the state-action doctrine." Patrick, 486 U.S. at 103. 
334. See, e.g., California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1962) 
(concluding that the Natural Gas Act provided no express exemption from antitrust laws and that 
the Federal Power Commission was not given the power to enforce the antitrust laws); United States 
v. Radio Corp. ofAm., 358 U.S. 334, 352-53 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that FCC 
approval ofa contract between NBC and Westinghouse to acquire certain television stations under 
a "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard did not bar antitrust review). For a detailed 
discussion of these to doctrines as applied to the approval of settlements, see Koniak & Cohen, 
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Consequently, when the settlement agreement itself represents the restraint 
of trade, courts cannot lend their aid or authority to such agreements. Under 
those circumstances, even ifthe conduct can be considered petitioning, it cannot 
be considered valid petitioning. The parties to the agreement would either be 
fraudulently concealing the anticompetitive nature of their agreement because 
they know that the court could not otherwise approve it, or they would be asking 
the court itself to engage in clearly prohibited conduct by approving an otherwise 
illegal agreement. Under either circumstance, petitioning immunity would not 
be justified.m 
CONCLUSION 
While the right to petition was once considered the most fundamental right 
ofthe English because it was the principal means for criticizing government and 
seeking political change, its importance under the United States Constitution has 
been overshadowed by other cognate rights. Freedom of speech and expanded 
rights of political participation provide additional avenues for seeking the ends 
once protected by petitioning alone. Despite this diminished prominence, the 
Noerr doctrine demonstrates that the right to petition remains a vital part of our 
constitutional system ofgovernment by affording immunity for efforts to solicit 
government action. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the boundaries of the right . 
are so poorly defined. 
By examining petitioning's history and the development of the Noerr 
doctrine, this Article suggests a methodology for determining whether conduct 
is protected by the right to petition. Focusing on whether the private conduct is 
a valid effort to influence government, the means/source analysis both clarifies 
and simplifies the immunity analysis while remaining true to petitioning's 
constitutional status and its history. By limiting petitioning immunity to valid 
persuasive efforts, the means/source analysis also minimizes any potential 
conflict between the First Amendment and the antitrust laws without 
overemphasizing the values embodied in the antitrust laws. Lastly, by applying 
this analysis to the settlement of litigation, we see that while the symmetry of 
immunizing decisions to either "accept or reject" a settlement is facially 
appealing, it does not withstand deeper analysis. By affirmatively withdrawing 
their dispute from governmental deliberation, parties to settlements are 
responsible for any restraints upon competition that may result from their 
agreements even if a judge approves the settlement. 
supra note 8. 
335 . See supra Part II.A.I. 
